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Abstract
E-Science Grid infrastructures are established on the collaboration of mul-
tiple and possibly otherwise independent and globally distributed organi-
zations connected via the Internet. Thereby instantiated e-Science Grids
provide the researchers of these globally distributed organizations with
unified access to large-scale computing and storage services, including the
access to large-scale scientific data as such. It is part of their purpose that
e-Science Grids allow collaborating researchers to introduce their own data
and program code in the course of their work. Beyond, via submission of
Grid jobs any program code can be executed as detached computational
operation within the distributed computing infrastructure.
This openness of allowed introduction and usage of data and program
code poses a substantial security threat. The delegation of privileges in the
course of Grid jobs submissions in combination with the users’ allowance to
introduce and utilize a priori untrusted program code and data is however
a widely identified security challenge [78, 61, 121]. The main contribution of
this thesis is to propose a new framework for delegation and an according
Grid security architecture in response to this challenge.
Following a discussion of the goals and requirements of e-Science Grids
in general, and an overview and comparison of existing and in-use e-Science
Grid architectures in particular, this thesis will analyze security aspects
applying to such e-Science Grid infrastructures. The thereof derived and
defined security objectives concern data integrity and authenticity, system in-
tegrity, availability, non-repudiation of Grid job submission and processing
as well as confidentiality and data privacy.
Looking at the case of an established e-Science Grid framework, vulner-
abilities and security implications of existing distributed e-Science Grids
will be examined. Furthermore the widely adopted unrestricted delegation
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based on X.509 proxy certificates [132] will be assessed, revealing funda-
mental deficiencies concerning the unverifiable correlation of assignment
and delegation of privileges, which facilitates potential misuse of privileges
and digital identities.
In order to address these issues, this thesis will introduce “mediated defi-
nite delegation” as a new framework for delegation. The framework utilizes
public-key signatures and affords verifiable integrity and authenticity of
Grid data and jobs as well as transparent, dynamic and least-privileged
delegation of Grid jobs via one or more brokers to an agent. Its delegation
mechanism provides protection against misuse of the delegating user’s
identity as well as against unnoticed alteration of the requested actions.
Finally, an e-Science Grid security architecture established on this frame-
work will be presented and specified, which is able satisfy the defined
security objectives. As a proof of concept, a prototype implementation
of this e-Science Grid security architecture will be presented, including a
test-based evaluation of its performance.
Zusammenfassung
E-Science-Grid-Infrastrukturen basieren auf der Kollaboration einer Vielzahl
von unabhängigen und global verteilten Organisationen, welche durch das
Internet digital verbunden sind. Dadurch geschaffene e-Science-Grids er-
möglichen den Wissenschaftlern dieser Organisationen einen einheitlichen
Zugang zu Hochleistungsrechner und -speichersystemen sowie zu um-
fangreichen wissenschaftlichen Daten. Die Nutzung von eigens einge-
brachten Daten und Programmcodes durch Wissenschaftler im Rahmen
ihrer Forschungsarbeit stellt dabei einen zentralen Verwendungszweck eines
e-Science-Grids dar. Dabei kann die Ausführung beliebiger Programmcodes
in Form von Grid-Jobs in Auftrag gegeben werden, welche als automa-
tisierte Prozesse innerhalb der Grid-Infrastruktur verteilt und ausgeführt
werden.
Dieser Offenheitsgrad der Verwendung von eigens eingebrachten Daten
und Programmcodes stellt eine substantielle Sicherheitsbedrohung dar. Die
Delegation von Benutzerprivilegien im Zuge der Versendung von Grid-
Jobs in Kombination mit der erlaubten Einbringung von a priori nicht
vertrauenswürdigen Daten und Programmcodes ist jedoch eine bekannte
Herausforderung innerhalb der IT-Sicherheit [78, 61, 121]. Der zentrale
Beitrag der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Spezifikation eines neuen Delega-
tionsverfahrens und einer darauf aufbauenden Sicherheitsarchitektur für
e-Science-Grids als Lösung für dieses Problem.
Nach einer Diskussion der Ziele und Voraussetzungen von e-Science-
Grid-Infrastrukturen im Allgemeinen und einem Vergleich bestehender
e-Science-Grid-Architekturen werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit die Sicher-
heitsaspekte von e-Science-Grid-Infrastrukturen analysiert. Die davon
abgeleiteten Sicherheitsziele betreffen Datenintegrität und -authentizität,
Systemintegrität, Verfügbarkeit, Verbindlichkeit der Entsendung und Verar-
beitung von Grid-Jobs sowie Vertraulichkeit und Datenschutz.
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Am Beispiel eines bestehenden und genutzten e-Science-Grids werden
Schwachstellen und Sicherheitsauswirkungen in Bezug auf das System und
die dazugehörige verteilte Infrastruktur untersucht. Darüber hinaus wird
das weithin genutzte Delegationsverfahren der unbeschränkten Delega-
tion basierend auf X.509-Proxy-Zertifikaten [132] analysiert. Dabei werden
fundamentale Schwachstellen aufgezeigt, die insbesondere die nicht veri-
fizierbare Korrelation von Aufträgen und delegierten Privilegien betreffen
und folglich den Missbrauch von Privilegien und digitalen Identitäten er-
möglichen.
Als Lösung wird “mediated definite delegation” als ein neues Delega-
tionsverfahren basierend auf digitalen Public-Key-Signaturen präsentiert
und spezifiziert. Das Verfahren ermöglicht verifizierbare Integrität und
Authentizität von Grid-Daten und -Jobs sowie eine transparente, dynamisch
vermittelbare und geringst-möglich privilegierende Delegation von Grid-
Jobs über einen oder mehrere Vermittler. Weiterhin ermöglicht es den
Schutz der digitalen Identität eines delegierenden Benutzers vor Missbrauch
und verhindert eine unbemerkte Veränderung der in Auftrag gegebenen
Vorgänge.
Schließlich wird eine Sicherheitsarchitektur für e-Science-Grids präsen-
tiert und spezifiziert, welche auf dem Delegationsverfahren basiert und das
Erreichen der definierten Sicherheitsziele ermöglicht. Eine Implementierung
der Sicherheitsarchitektur als Prototyp wird vorgestellt, und die Leistungs-
fähigkeit der Implementierung innerhalb einer testbasierten Evaluation
bestätigt.
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"The beginning is the most
important part of the work."
Plato
1
Introduction
Science utilizing computationally intensive research methods established
on the collaboration of research organizations is generally referred to as
e-Science [27] and applies to many research areas, such as particle physics,
medicine, biology and geology. Grid computing is a technical architecture
model applied within such cyberinfrastructures and provides a distributed
system layer arranged on top of discrete and localized distributed systems
of lower order.
With multiple and possibly otherwise independent and globally dis-
tributed organizations connected via the Internet, e-Science Grid infrastruc-
tures provide researchers with unified access to large scale computing and
storage services, including the access to large-scale scientific data as such.
In doing so, collaborating researchers are allowed and invited to introduce
their own data and program code in the course of their work, and to submit
requests for predefined and later-detached computational tasks, which are
executed as Grid jobs within the distributed computing infrastructure.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
From a technical perspective, e-Science Grid infrastructures do not only
interconnect organizations and researchers, but providers and users beyond
the borders of the underlying organizational affiliation and the correspond-
ing levels or domains of control and responsibility. Accordingly, e-Science
Grid infrastructures are required to facilitate traceability [91, 116] of oper-
ations and their users’ activities as well as protection against illicit system
usage.
However, the necessary delegation of privileges in the course of submis-
sions of Grid jobs, in combination with the users’ allowance to introduce
and utilize a priori untrusted program code and data, represents a widely
identified security challenge [78, 61, 121]. Moreover, the interconnection of
entities and players dissolves the classical differentiation of internal and
external attackers in view of potential vulnerabilities or malicious insiders
in any of the employed systems and layers. Consequently, an e-Science
Grid infrastructure cannot only rely on protection against inbound attacks,
but must be protected as well against malicious insiders, being used as a
platform for outbound malicious actions or facilitating attacks on any of its
sub-systems or third party entities.
This thesis presents a new framework for delegation and its incorpora-
tion in a Grid security architecture utilizing public-key signatures, affording
transparent, dynamic and least-privileged delegation of Grid jobs. The
presented Grid security architecture provides protection of a Grid infras-
tructure against undetectable malicious behavior as well as protection of its
users’ digital identities and reputations, without constraining or limiting
the infrastructure’s discretionary and permissive use.
The particle physics experiments of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) [31]
and their corresponding international Grid infrastructure project, the World-
wide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) [35], have been a driving force in the
development and establishment of international e-Science Grid infrastruc-
tures. The ALICE [1] experiment, as one of the four large LHC experiments,
is the main reference point of the herein presented work, as an existing
and in-use e-Science Grid infrastructure. The detector of the experiment
is built and operated by an international research collaboration [2] and its
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computational analysis is based on the ALICE Grid Services [3]. As an inter-
national e-Science Grid infrastructure, the ALICE Grid Services provide a
unified environment for the physics data analysis of the experiment based
on more than 70 computing centers of collaborating institutes located in
over 30 countries.
Beyond their relevance in the scope of Grid infrastructures and the Grid
computing paradigm, the results presented in this thesis have further sig-
nificance within the field of cloud computing. There, the processing of
user- or client-provided code is likewise a basic functionality, e.g. via Infras-
tructure or Platform as a Service layers. An example are cloud customers
building yet another service level on top of utilized cloud infrastructures: in
doing so, these customers act at the same time as service providers, while
being presumably liable [10] for the transitive usage of a respective cloud
infrastructure by their end users.
1.2 Outline and Summary of Results
This thesis is divided into three parts. A general description of current uses
and architectural models of e-Science is presented in Chapters 2 and 3 to
set the scene for the contributions of this thesis. In Chapter 2, an e-Science
scenario is specified, outlining the typical usage and characteristics as well as
its relevant assets. Chapter 3 defines a generic architecture for an e-Science
Grid, based on a comparison of existing infrastructures.
The second part addresses security aspects of an e-Science environment.
Chapter 4 identifies relevant criteria as security objectives and Chapter 5
and 6 present vulnerabilities and deficiencies in existing e-Science Grid
infrastructures and methodologies. Chapter 5 will examine the concrete case
of the ALICE experiment, and Chapter 6 will analyze the widely deployed
unrestricted delegation based on X.509 proxy certificates.
The third part of this thesis presents a solution with respect to the se-
curity objectives and deficiencies identified. Chapter 7 introduces a new
framework for delegation, which stipulates digitally signed textual state-
ments for both delegation and attestation of data authorship. The following
Chapter 8 then presents an e-Science Grid security architecture able to meet
the security objectives defined in Chapter 4, which is established on the
introduced delegation framework while also including further mechanisms.
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This part of the thesis concludes by the presentation of a prototype imple-
mentation and its performance evaluation in Chapter 9. The thesis then
concludes in Chapter 10, summarizing its contribution and results and dis-
cussing future work.
A summary of the research contributions and results of this thesis is pre-
sented as follows:
Chapter 2: E-Science Computing Based on the ALICE [1] experiment’s
e-Science Grid environment and other e-Science infrastructures and ap-
proaches, a generic e-Science scenario is defined. Further on, assets with
respect to the scenario are specified, based on a generalization and extension
of the existing definition of assets within the WLCG [PUB8]. Both scenario
and assets will be utilized in particular as the basis for the definition of
security objectives in Chapter 4.
The e-Science scenario is summarized as follows: research organizations
collaborate within the organizational framework of a Virtual Organiza-
tion (VO). This VO combines the distributed organizations and respective
facilities and achieves their unification within one collaboration and a cor-
responding framework, instead of concurrent and discrete operations and
research. On the basis of this framework, cross-organizational unified access
to distributed data and processing infrastructure is provided to its users.
This enables the processing of scientific data via submission of predefined
tasks (Grid jobs) subsequently executed within the infrastructure, wherein
the utilization of user-provided program code and data is facilitated.
Chapter 3: E-Science Grid Architectures On the basis of a specifica-
tion of the architecture of the ALICE Grid Services [3] and a subsequent
comparison with other instantiated e-Science Grid infrastructures, a generic
e-Science Grid architecture is defined. This architecture will be utilized
in the subsequent chapters of this thesis as the reference architecture for
e-Science Grids.
The e-Science Grid architecture is summarized as follows: within the
framework of a VO, a virtual Grid layer is established by logical abstraction,
connecting a multitude of sub-systems as services and clients via uncon-
trolled networks, including the Internet. Collaborating institutes as Sites
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provide computing and storage infrastructure as Worker Nodes and Storage
Elements, which are logically unified within a set of Central Grid Services,
most importantly providing Grid File Catalogs and Grid Task Queues. Grid
users are provided with access to virtual Grid file systems, established by
Grid File Catalogs and Site-provided Storage Elements as physical storage
devices. Further, Grid users are provided with access to computational
resources via the submission of tasks as predefined textual requests, here-
after referred to as Grid jobs, to Grid Task Queues. These are subsequently
distributed to Site-provided Worker Nodes and executed without a user’s
interference or attention.
Chapter 4: Security Analysis of e-Science Grids In reference to the de-
fined e-Science scenario and Grid architecture, the involved players and
their relationships, the security characteristics and potential attack motives
and targets are specified, and derived security objectives defined. These
security objectives will be used in the subsequent chapters of this thesis as
general assessment criteria.
E-Science Grids are based on the interactions of three basic groups of
players: first, the Virtual Organization (VO) operators, second, the collab-
orating Sites as providers, and third, the VO’s Grid users. Moreover there
are third parties like other VOs or organizations as adjacent or co-users of
the shared infrastructure as well as umbrella Grid organizations in which
several VOs can be embedded in.
The specified security characteristics are an e-Science Grid’s public com-
munication environment, the discretionary controlled and non-exclusive
Site-provided resources, the discretionary usage by its users and uncon-
trolled client environments, and the cross-organizational access within the
infrastructure. The consequently defined security objectives for e-Science
Grids concern data integrity and authenticity, system integrity, availability,
non-repudiation of Grid job submission and processing, and confidentiality
and data privacy.
Chapter 5: Vulnerability Analysis of the ALICE Grid Services A vulner-
ability analysis of the ALICE Grid Services as an established in-use e-Science
Grid infrastructure is presented, identifying a series of vulnerabilities and
deficiencies.
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In essence, these affect the infrastructure’s inbound and outbound pro-
tection and the authenticity and authorship of entities and interactions
within the established Grid layer. The vulnerabilities originate in the infras-
tructure’s reliance on unverified or user-provided information concerning
authenticity and authorship. Further on, the Grid job processing and exe-
cution is based on delegation by masquerade, which allows unverifiable
misuse of privileges and digital identities of job submitters.
Chapter 6: Analysis of Delegation and X.509 Proxy Certificates Fol-
lowing an analysis of delegation in Grid computing and X.509 proxy cer-
tificates [132] as well as their propagation within a Grid infrastructure,
vulnerabilities and deficiencies identified in the widely adopted delegation
approach of unrestricted delegation based on X.509 proxy certificates are
specified.
The analysis reveals fundamental deficiencies and vulnerabilities con-
cerning Grid job delegation, which most importantly are the unverifiable
correlation of assignment and delegation and the dependence on and re-
quired trust in VOs and Sites concerning potential misuse. Consequently,
unrestricted delegation by utilization of X.509 proxy certificates is assumed
to provide no fundamental improvement in comparison to mechanisms im-
plementing delegation by masquerade, as they afford unidentifiable misuse
of privileges and digital identities.
Chapter 7: A Framework for Transparent Dynamic Delegation A new
delegation framework named mediated definite delegation is presented, facili-
tating transparent, dynamic and least-privileged delegation of tasks.
The framework is based on textual statements for both task delegations
and attestation of data authorship, which are required to be signed using
public-key signature mechanisms. In case of task delegations, cascaded sig-
natures are utilized within the different steps of submission and processing
and propagation, while a task delegation can be processed and propagated
via more than one broker to an agent for execution. The mechanisms afford
non-repudiation of authorship of data as well as of task delegations and
their processing and propagation. Moreover, task delegations as credentials
afford protection against misuse of the delegating user’s identity as well as
against unnoticed alteration of the requested actions.
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The framework and its mechanisms integrate completely into the e-
Science Grid architecture defined in Chapter 3 and require no remote call-
backs or additional invocations.
Chapter 8: A Security Architecture for e-Science Grids Based on the
introduced framework of mediated definite delegation, a new security architec-
ture for e-Science Grids is presented and specified.
Involving mechanisms with respect to Grid data layer access, storage-
confirmed authenticity of Grid file data and a dynamic storage discovery,
the security architecture provides certified Grid files via user-signed File
Certificates. Furthermore, on the basis of an initial signature of a Grid job
request by a submitter, and a subsequent additionally applied signature by
an e-Science VO as a broker, certified Grid jobs are achieved. The resulting
concept of a Job Certificate offers verification of an initial submission as
well as its later processing as a Grid job and arranges for the utilization of
isolation mechanisms for Grid job execution.
The enforced utilization of File and Job Certificates establishes verifi-
able authenticity of the represented entities and non-repudiation of their
authorship. Hence, meaningful decision-making concerning the traceability
of Grid files and jobs can be achieved. Beyond the framework of mediated
definite delegation, the security architecture for e-Science Grids thereby
facilitates the fulfillment of the security objectives defined in Chapter 4.
Chapter 9: A Grid Middleware Prototype Within the Grid middleware
project jAliEn [22], the introduced security architecture for e-Science Grids
was implemented as a prototype, with a focus on the security architec-
tureâA˘Z´s concepts of Grid job delegation and Job Certificates.
The implementation provides Grid service communication via serial-
ization and exchange of high-level Java objects, established on mutually
authenticated and encrypted connections. The implemented prototype
represents a proof of concept of the Grid security architecture, with its
practical relevance being confirmed within a presented performance evalua-
tion. Despite the employed security mechanisms and digitally signed Grid
job submissions, the performance evaluation reveals notably capacity with
respect to service response times as well as to scalability and high loads.
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"Science knows no country, because
knowledge belongs to humanity, and is
the torch which illuminates the world."
Louis Pasteur
2
E-Science Computing
In this chapter the e-Science Grid infrastructure of the ALICE [1] experi-
ment as well as other Grid-based e-Science examples and scenarios will be
analyzed concerning their utilization as distributed research cyberinfrastruc-
tures.
The analysis aims at the understanding of the purpose, objectives and
characteristics of e-Science Grid infrastructures, without referring explicitly
to Grid computing architecture or terminology. The chapter will conclude
in the definition of a generic e-Science scenario as a set of characteristics and
the specification of the assets of a corresponding e-Science infrastructure.
The scenario as well as the assets represent the foundation of the work
subsequently presented within this document.
2.1 E-Science in Particle Physics
The analyses and work presented in this document utilizes the ALICE (A
Large Ion Collider Experiment) [1] experiment’s e-Science Grid infrastructure
as its main reference point. The ALICE experiment is one of the four large
experiments within the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) [31], with ATLAS
10 Chapter 2. E-Science Computing
(A Toroidal LHC Apparatus) [8], CMS (Compact Muon Solenoid) [12] and
LHCb (Large Hadron Collider beauty) [23] as the remaining three large
experiments.
The LHC is a particle accelerator and collider ring with a circumfer-
ence of approx. 27 kilometers [94]. It is located at the border of France
and Switzerland near the city of Geneva in a tunnel more than 50 meters
under the surface and is operated by the European Organization for Nu-
clear Research (CERN) [18], a physics research institute and international
organization.
2.1.1 ALICE Experiment
The particle physics experiment ALICE is based on a particle detector within
the LHC, able to detect and identify the results of proton and nuclei colli-
sions, and is focused in particular on heavy-ion collisions. Figure 2.1 shows
a sample of lead-ion collisions recorded by the detector.
Figure 2.1: Events recorded by the ALICE experiment from the first lead-
ion collisions in 2011. Source: [2]
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Data acquisition The detector’s data acquisition system generates raw
data sets describing selected particle interactions, within the detector’s mea-
surement range and within a certain time frame, at a yearly data rate of more
than 1 petabyte per year during LHC operation. These raw data sets are
reconstructed in order to identify e.g. the concerned particles, their tracks,
energy and lifetime. The reconstructed data is then analyzed in matters of
confirmation of existing or formulation of new physics theories and models.
ALICE Collaboration The ALICE detector and all its infrastructure is
operated by the ALICE Collaboration [2], which has approx. 1200 members
from 132 participating institutes in 36 countries.
2.1.2 ALICE Grid Services
The ALICE Grid Services [3], a globally distributed open science and research
cyberinfrastructure, are the main computing facility of the ALICE experi-
ment. Its infrastructure is currently composed of more than 70 computing
centers, provided by collaborating institutes located in over 30 countries,
combining up to 50k CPU cores and 30 petabytes of data storage and is
serving approx. 1000 active users within the ALICE Collaboration. The
ALICE Collaboration as the operator of the ALICE detector as well as the
ALICE Grid Services represents a Virtual Organization [79]. With the collab-
orating institutes providing storage and computational resources in their
computing centers to the ALICE Grid Services, the ALICE VO includes both
its computing environment’s resource providers and its users.
Operational tasks The ALICE Grid Services are used for the three tasks of
simulation, reconstruction and analysis of detector data [129, 126, 83]. The raw
data generated by the ALICE detector’s data acquisition system is directly
stored on storage sub-systems attached to the ALICE Grid Services and
consecutively replicated and processed with the Grid. The processing is
organized and parallelized based on data sets, following the distinctive
criterion of an event in the detector as the root cause for a certain set of data.
All three tasks are conducted as both, general processing, as well as within
single user’s activities. Accordingly, the systems usage is classified into
scheduled processing or passes organized centrally within the collaboration,
and user-driven processing.
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Service level The ALICE Grid Services provide both a Platform as a
Service as well as a Software as a Service layer, whereas the latter is based on
unified research software appliances. In essence, the infrastructure provides
a global file system by unifying a distributed storage infrastructure and a
centralized job submission portal, distributing computing tasks to its com-
puting centers. The job submission is based on predefined task descriptions
with no direct influence by or interaction with the submitting user during a
job’s runtime.
Usage Users are allowed to deliberately submit any kind of job, have
to declare [92] though to use the infrastructure only in line with their re-
search within the experiment. It is constituted by policy [47] that all data, be
it produced by the detector or by data processing within the infrastructure’s
environment, can be accessed by every member of the collaboration, viz. by
every user within the ALICE Grid Services.
Collaboration The supply and maintenance of resources by members
of the ALICE collaboration, including the computing resources provided
to the ALICE Grid Services by the institute’s computing centers, are free of
charge. The incentive for contribution is, next to the institute’s participation
in the experiment as such and the thereby assumed reputation, the access to
the experiment’s data and research for an institute’s members.
2.1.3 Other Particle Physics Experiments
Although the four large LHC experiments ALICE, ATLAS, CMS and LHCb
focus on different research aspects of particle physics and are based on dis-
tinct detectors and Grid environments, they were developed and built next
to each other and share the same scenario [126, 127, 128, 131]: analogous
to the ALICE Grid Services, the ATLAS, CMS and LHCb utilize each their
own Grid-based e-Science infrastructure for simulation, reconstruction and
analysis of respective detector data and are based on collaborations, repre-
senting both the Grid users and institutes providing computing resources.
All infrastructures provide unified data layers and frameworks for submis-
sion of predefined jobs for scheduled and user-driven data processing. Their
key figures are as follows: the ATLAS experiment and its collaboration [9]
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has approx. 3000 members, more than 1000 active Grid users [99], and over
130 participating computing centers [89]. The CMS experiment’s collabo-
ration [13, 14] has more than 3000 members, more than 1200 users of its
Grid infrastructure and over 100 participating computing centers [68, 39].
The LHCb experiment, collaboration [32] more than 600 members from 17
countries.
Worldwide LHC Computing Grid The four collaborations of the LHC ex-
periments represent Virtual Organizations united within the Worldwide LHC
Computing Grid (WLCG) [35, 129], an umbrella organization established as a
common Grid computing infrastructure, responsible for the coordination,
operation and maintenance of the participating VO’s computing centers,
infrastructures and services.
Further examples of analogous e-Science scenarios in particle physics are
the experiments CBM [11, 113], PANDA [33, 109, 113] and SuperB [40].
2.2 E-Science Examples Beyond Physics
With a multitude of existing e-Science infrastructures and according us-
age scenarios, some selected specifications and examples are presented as
follows:
In [125], a study of biomedical research workflows and patterns with
respect to a potential utilization of high-performance and Grid computing
infrastructures is presented. The specified use cases are the simulation,
preprocessing and analysis of scientific data, based on distributed computa-
tional infrastructure and unified cross-organizational access to distributed
and independent data sources.
The GEO (Global Earth Observation) Grid [82] establishes unified data
storage of and access to satellite imagery, geological archives and sensors
of different organizations and collaborations. It further provides facilities
for distributed simulation and analysis, e.g. in geological and ecological
research and disaster mitigation [117].
The e-BioGrid [16] is a dutch e-Science infrastructure for life science re-
search. It is based on a gateway for biomedical data analysis [119] connected
to the national e-Science Grid infrastructure SURFSara [29]. The gateway
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provides unified access to computing facilities and software appliances for
biomedical research. The e-Science infrastructure is utilized for simulation
and analysis of e.g. biological samples, genomics and nanoscopy and medi-
cal image data. A further example of an e-Science infrastructure based on a
gateway to an independent Grid infrastructure is the Charité Grid Portal [135],
which has an analogous usage scenario in medical research.
2.3 An e-Science Scenario
Based on the e-Science approaches presented in the previous sections, the
characteristics of a globally distributed e-Science cyberinfrastructure will be
summarized as a generalized scenario as follows:
Collaboration within Virtual Organizations Independent research or-
ganizations and possibly single researchers collaborate within the organiza-
tional framework of a Virtual Organization. The collaboration presumably
has an international basis and the utilized infrastructure combines interna-
tionally distributed facilities.
Unified data acquisition and distribution The acquisition or recording
and unification of valued scientific data within a data framework. At the
same time the framework arranges for data replication within a geographic
and organizational distribution.
Unified distributed processing The consolidation of discrete processing
facilities into one logical framework providing a unified coordination and
handling of distributed processing. Via a dedicated service layer, researchers
are able to conduct simulation, preprocessing and analysis of scientific data
via submission of predefined task descriptions, which are executed within
the infrastructure without their attendance. They are thereby technically
enabled and allowed to supply program code and data, and to use these in
line with their research.
Synergy and collaboration The combination and unification of distributed
knowledge and data as well as human and technological resources within
a collaboration and a corresponding framework instead of concurrent or
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discrete operations and research.
Distributed unified access Cross-organizational unified access to dis-
tributed data and processing facilities.
2.4 Assets of an e-Science Infrastructure
In this section, assets of an e-Science VO with respect to its distributed
research infrastructure will be presented. The section is based on a gen-
eralization and extension of the list of assets defined in the WLCG Risk
Assessment [PUB8].
The first two identified assets of an e-Science VO concern the relation-
ship of its members and participating organizations and the terms of their
association.
Trust and collaboration The trust between members, collaborating infras-
tructures and organizations, external partners and funding agencies and the
collaboration established on this trust are fundamental operational prereq-
uisites and must be protected and maintained.
Reputation The opinion of the general public, funding agencies and mem-
bers about an e-Science VO as an organization and its operation is a primary
asset. Due to the mutual relation this includes also protecting the reputation
of all members and participating organizations joined together within the
technical framework of the e-Science VO.
Trust, collaboration and reputation represent the foundations of an e-
Science infrastructure as an entity arranged for the interaction and cooper-
ation of distributed components provided by multiple organizations and
players. Any interference with operational assets as presented below is
thereby assumed to have potential impact on these foundational assets.
Data integrity The accurate storage, lack of alteration and consistency
of acquired and handled data within the infrastructure of an e-Science VO,
including personal or meta data.
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Data protection The sovereignty and control of access to data acquired
and processed within the infrastructure of an e-Science VO, including per-
sonal or meta data, as well as data confidentiality and non-disclosure with
respect to non-participating individuals. Depending on the valuation of an
actual e-Science VO, this possibly also includes different levels of internal
data protection within an e-Science infrastructure and protection.
Intellectual property and provenance Authorship and consequent intel-
lectual property on scientific work and results, including techniques, proce-
dures and methods utilized in the course of their achievement. This includes
the ability to prove the provenance of scientific work and to enable repro-
ducible findings.
Digital identities The integrity and availability as well as the absence
of compromisation, exposure or forgery of any credentials, attributes or
other information required for the correct identification, authentication and
authorization of an e-Science infrastructure’s users and entities.
Resources The integrity and availability of all entities that allow an e-Science
VO to store data, meta data or any other information (data resources), conduct
computation and calculations (computing resources) and connect entities and
establish communications (network resources).
Service and infrastructure The integrity and availability of any software
systems providing services relevant for the access, control, management,
monitoring, processing or communication within an e-Science Grid environ-
ment.
2.5 Summary
A generic e-Science scenario has been defined in this chapter, based on the
ALICE [1] experiment’s e-Science Grid environment and other e-Science
infrastructures and approaches.
In this scenario, research organizations collaborate within the organi-
zational framework of a Virtual Organization (VO). This VO combines the
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distributed organizations and respective facilities and achieves their unifica-
tion within one collaboration and a corresponding framework. On the basis
of this framework, cross-organizational unified access to distributed data
and processing infrastructure is provided to the VO’s users. This enables
the processing of scientific data via submission of predefined tasks (Grid
jobs) subsequently executed within the distributed infrastructure, whereby
the utilization of user-provided program code and data is facilitated.
Furthermore, assets with respect to the scenario have been specified,
based on a generalization and extension of the existing definition of assets
within the WLCG [PUB8]. Both the scenario and its assets represent the
foundation of the work subsequently presented within this document and
will be utilized in particular as the basis for a security analysis and definition
of security objectives in Chapter 4.
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"Architecture starts when you carefully
put two bricks together. There it begins."
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe
3
E-Science Grid Architectures
In this chapter, a specification of the architecture of the ALICE Grid Ser-
vices [3] and alternative e-Science Grid infrastructures will be presented,
followed by the definition of an according generic e-Science Grid architec-
ture.
In the first part of this chapter, the architecture and implementation of
the ALICE Grid Services, and its central Grid middleware AliEn [4], will be
analyzed, specifying the underlying infrastructure and layout, authentica-
tion and access control mechanisms, provided user interfaces and finally,
the thereon-established Grid data and job layers. This detailed analysis will
provide the basis for a vulnerability analysis of the ALICE Grid Services in
Chapter 5.
Subsequently and in comparison to the ALICE Grid Services, architec-
tures of alternative e-Science Grid infrastructures will be examined. Based
on the comparison, a generic e-Science Grid architecture will be defined at
the end of this chapter, which will constitute the reference Grid architecture
for the subsequent chapters of this document.
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3.1 ALICE Grid Services
The ALICE Grid Services are a globally distributed storage and computation
Grid operated by the ALICE Collaboration [2] [1] as a Virtual Organization
(VO). The central Grid middleware AliEn (ALICE Environment) [4, 111, 58]
is an open source Grid framework, developed and maintained within the
ALICE Collaboration. The ALICE Grid Services are embedded in the World-
wide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG)[35] (see Section 2.1.3), the top tier
association of the Grid activities of the LHC experiments. At the time of
completion of this document, the ALICE Grid Services are based on more
than 70 computing centers located in over 30 countries, combining up to 50k
CPU cores and 30PB of storage [3], and are utilized as the main computing
infrastructure by approx. 1000 active users within the ALICE Collaboration.
The central Grid middleware AliEn is written in Perl [34] and based
on distributed services communicating via the Simple Object Access Proto-
col (SOAP) [102] while utilizing MySQL [26] databases and a Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [38] service as persistent data structure.
The central middleware establishes a globally unified Grid layer: a Grid
data layer based on a central file catalog as a logical data structure and a
distributed set of storage systems provided by the collaborating computing
centers, and a Grid job layer providing a central task queue with a workload
management system.
Beyond the ALICE Collaboration as the originator and main user, the
ALICE Grid Service’s architecture and its middleware AliEn are adopted
and utilized also by the particle physics experiments CBM [11, 113] and
PANDA [33, 109, 113].
Fabric The Grid fabric [77] of the ALICE Grid Services is most impor-
tantly based on a set of core computing systems running the so called central
services located at CERN, and a multitude of distributed computing centers.
A computing center, hereafter referred to as Site, provides each hundreds to
thousands of Worker Nodes (WNs) as computing facilities and one or several
storage systems, so called Storage Elements (SEs). A Site’s infrastructure is
provided non-exclusively, viz. it must be assumed to be shared with further
operations such as other VOs and their corresponding infrastructures or any
other Site-specific utilization.
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WNs on a Site are aggregated within the Site’s resource management
system and are accessible to the Grid Services via one or more batch system
interfaces, so called Computing Elements. These Computing Elements, and
thereby the Site’s WNs, are connected to the ALICE Grid Services via ALICE-
specific Site services, running on a dedicated Site-based computing system,
called VOBox. The portal service to a Site, the AliEn ClusterMonitor, is
running on a Site’s VOBox and acts as an access gateway to a Computing
Element and as a communication proxy for Grid jobs on WNs (see below).
All central services within the ALICE Grid Services as well as VOBoxes
and WNs on Site-level are based on the Linux operating system.
3.1.1 Authentication and Access Control
This section will present a brief overview of the connectivity and authen-
tication and authorization mechanisms in the ALICE Grid Services. More
detailed specifications and analyses will be presented in the consecutive
sections within this chapter and the remainder of this document.
Apart from mutual central service and Site-internal communication, as
for instance between ClusterMonitor and WNs or WNs and SEs of the same
Site, all communication of services and entities in the ALICE Grid Services
is Internet-based. The authentication of services, Sites and Grid users within
the ALICE Grid Services is established based on X.509 certificates [69] and
X.509 proxy certificates [101, 132], utilizing the Globus Toolkit [76, 78]. The
trust anchor of the certificate infrastructure is the International Grid Trust
Federation [21], which maintains and provides access to root certificates of
recognized certificate authorities, certificate revocation lists and policies as
a so called trust anchor distribution. Any authentication via X.509 certificates
or X.509 proxy certificates is verified based on this trust anchor.
All services, Sites and Grid users in the ALICE Grid Services are regis-
tered within records in a central LDAP directory service. A service entry
specifies e.g. the service name, a uniform resource locator (URL) and its
capabilities. Sites are represented by records specifying their capabilities and
configuration settings and entries of all its Site services, e.g. the Computing
Elements and SEs. Every recognized Grid user is listed with a record in the
directory service, containing e.g. its username, real name, email address and
an entry containing the distinguished name specified in the user’s X.509
certificate.
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Site services The services running on a VOBox are executed within the
machine’s operating system using a non-privileged user account. The com-
munication between a VOBox and central services is mutually authenticated,
based on an X.509 host certificate on the part of central services and X.509
proxy certificates for Site services. These proxy certificates are derived from
the VOBox’s X.509 host certificate, which is not directly accessible from
ALICE Site services.
User access Access to the Grid layer by users is authenticated using
X.509 proxy certificates derived from the user’s X.509 certificate and the ver-
ification of a respective user record in the LDAP directory. Within the Grid
layer, Grid users are referred to by the username listed within their LDAP
record. All authorization and authorship of object entities within the Grid
layer is based on these usernames, as well as group and role attributions.
A Grid user’s system usage is limited by a quota mechanism with respect
to Grid file entries and jobs. The accounted values are e.g. utilized Grid job
run time and CPU cost, and the number of Grid files and utilized storage
capacity.
3.1.2 User Interfaces
The ALICE Grid Services can be accessed via four different user interfaces:
two command-line interfaces, a library providing Grid access from within
the analysis framework as well as a graphical web interface.
The AliEn Perl Shell [48] is a command-line shell used by both Grid
users and administrators, which connects directly to central or Site-based
Perl services. A second command-line interface, the AliEn Shell (aliensh) [41]
provides a rich user functionality and is the main interface for scientific users.
Instead of a direct connection to Grid services, a dedicated central service,
the API service, operate as an intermediary between its client interfaces and
the Grid services. The initial authentication and authorization is based on
the same mechanism as within the AliEn Perl Shell using the X.509 proxy
certificate, while subsequently a session token is negotiated and used by
client interface and service.
The AliEn ROOT Interface [41] provides access to the Grid from within
the experiment’s physics analysis software framework [6], utilized both by
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Grid users and within Grid jobs as an interface for Grid file access. The
connection to the Grid environment is established analogously to the AliEn
Shell via the API service.
The Alimonitor [3] graphical web interface further provides user access
as well as administrational controls and statistics based on monitoring data.
The communication is mutually authenticated based on a Grid user’s X.509
certificate and the web service’s X.509 host certificate and is encrypted using
the Transport Layer Security [70] protocol.
3.1.3 Grid Data Layer
The data layer of the ALICE Grid Services is based on a global virtual Grid
file system established by one central file catalog [57, 50]. The file catalog as
the logical data structure is stored in a set of MySQL databases and accessi-
ble via central services.
File Catalog Structure An entry in the file catalog is primarily referred to
via a Logical File Name (LFN) entry within the POSIX-style Grid file system
hierarchy, which consists of file entries as LFNs, directories and an addi-
tional data annotation system [49, 50]. Due to the these annotations, file
entries can be associated and selected based on tags. Each LFN entry refers
to a Global Unique Identifier (GUID) entry as an internal identifier of a Grid
file, whereby several LFN entries can link to the same GUID entry.
The physical locations of Grid files are represented as Physical File Name
(PFN) entries in the file catalog. A GUID entry refers to one or several PFN
entries, representing each a copy of the same file. Thereby PFN entries
can refer to either file entries on Site-provided SEs as trusted storage sub-
systems or to arbitrary other data locations within the range of supported
protocols, such as SOAP or HTTP.
Access control Access to the file catalog is authorized based on file cata-
log entries and GUID and LFN entries have each their own POSIX-style
user and group ownership and read, write and execute permissions. The
access to PFN entries is regulated implicitly based on the authorization of a
respective GUID entry.
Access to physical data entries on SEs is provided via a proprietary
protocol [74]. Upon successful authorization of a request, a client receives
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an capability-based ticket, issued by a dedicated central service, and is con-
secutively able to access a physical file entry on an SE. Access to any not
SE-based data is not authorized explicitly and consequently required to be
directly accessible by a client. A detailed specification and analysis of the
protocol will be presented in section 5.2.
Data management and transfers The AliEn Grid data layer allows to
delegate the replication or movement of a physical data file from one SE
to another via submission of transfer requests: a client can submit a textual
transfer request specifying a GUID and respective PFNs to central services,
and upon successful authorization, the request is placed in a central transfer
queue. Queued requests are scheduled and propagated to dedicated transfer
agents, which consecutively execute the physical replication or movement of
the file data and modify the corresponding information of logical entries in
the file catalog.
ALICE detector Within the Grid layer of the ALICE Grid Services, the
ALICE detector is represented by a dedicated Grid user only. This user has
prioritized access to the virtual Grid file system in order to allow the upload
and registration of the detector’s physics data. The data is physically dis-
tributed over Sites according to a tiered structure [97], based on performance
characteristics, capacity and service level assurances.
3.1.4 Grid Job Layer
The computational layer of the ALICE Grid Services is based on the submis-
sion of Grid jobs as textual task specifications to a central task queue. The
task queue is accessible via central services and managed by a central work-
load management system (WMS) [56]. The WMS processes and schedules
submitted Grid jobs in the queue and initiates their propagation to Sites and
consecutive execution on WNs.
The Grid job layer provides a Platform as a Service as well as a Software
as a Service layer. The latter is established by a package management and
distribution mechanism, providing automated on demand installation of
Grid applications on WNs.
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Grid job submission Grid jobs are specified by so called JDL entries (orig-
inating from Job Description Language) as a formatted textual specification
derived from Condor ClassAds [15]. A Grid job is submitted to the central
task queue either by reference to an according JDL file in the file catalog
or directly as a textual JDL input. Within the JDL entry, references to Grid
file entries in the file catalog are specified as LFNs. A submitted JDL entry
specifies at least an LFN as the executable of the Grid job, which is later
downloaded to the WN and executed as an operating system process.
JDL Once a JDL is submitted to the task queue, the WMS appends
additional information according to the processing. Listing 3.1 shows a
simplified example of the JDL entry of a Grid job, briefly explained as fol-
lows: the specification of the executable and arguments for the execution is
followed by a listing of input files, which will be downloaded to the WN
and can be accessed during the runtime of the job from within the WN
process of the job as local files. Thereafter input data is specified, describing
an XML [19] file containing a data collection that will not be downloaded to
the WN and can be accessed remotely on an SE.
1 Executable = "/ a l i c e /user/a/auser/bin/ t r a i n . sh " ;
Arguments = "1630 LHC11h " ;
3 I n p u t F i l e =
{ " LF :/ a l i c e /user/a/auser/physics/ t r a i n . root " } ;
5 InputDataCol lec t ion =
{ " LF :/ a l i c e /sim/LHC12a17d/esd . xml , nodownload " } ;
7 S p l i t = " se " ;
Packages = { " VO_ALICE@AliRoot : : v5−03−56−AN" } ;
9 OutputDir = "/ a l i c e /sim/LHC12/Electrons_PbPb_MC / " ;
OutputFi les = { " Events . root , Resul t s . root , ∗ . s t a t " } ;
11 User = " auser " ;
JDLPath = "/ a l i c e /user/a/auser/ j d l s / t r a i n . j d l " ;
Listing 3.1: "Example of a Grid job’s JDL entry."
The subsequent splitting argument triggers the submitted job request to be
split by the WMS into several sub jobs, based on the distribution of the spec-
ified input data over different SEs. The consecutive package requirements
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specify software packages to be installed on a WN before the job’s execution.
Finally, output directory and files are specified, which will be uploaded to
SEs and registered accordingly in the file catalog.
JobAgent and Grid job execution Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the
Grid job layer of the ALICE Grid Services, which is further explained as
follows: instead of direct submission of Grid jobs to Sites’ Computing El-
ements, so called JobAgents (JAs) are submitted as requests to Computing
Elements by the AliEn central services. Once a JA request is executed on
a WN, it becomes a temporary Grid service, connects to central services
and requests Grid jobs as JDL entries for execution. This approach is gen-
erally known as the pilot job model or as pull [42, 58] paradigm. Due to this
functionality, a Site’s resource management system can be fully abstracted.
WNs are dynamically integrated into AliEn Grid layer, with a JA receiving
a fraction of a WN’s computational capabilities. The submission of JA re-
Figure 3.1: Pilot and Grid jobs in the ALICE Grid Services.
quests to a Site’s Computing Element is authenticated and authorized by
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the ClusterMonitor service’s X.509 proxy certificate on a VOBox. Thereby
each submission includes a copy of the X.509 proxy certificate, utilized by
the JA later on during its runtime. Once a JA request is sent to a WN for
execution, its textual specification is deserialized, including the X.509 proxy
certificate, and the JA is started as a service on the WN. The JA analyses
its capabilities based on the WN’s architecture and operating system with
respect to Grid applications available for a later installation on the WN. By
utilizing the X.509 proxy certificate for authentication and authorization, the
JA connects to central services and the WMS and advertises its capabilities,
including its time to live, and requests Grid jobs for execution. Once a match
of a JA’s capabilities and the requirements of a waiting Grid job in the task
queue occurs, the WMS creates a password for later authentication of the
Grid job, called a job token. The Grid job’s JDL entry and the created job
token is sent with the respective Grid job’s JDL entry to the JA. The JA will
perform potentially necessary installations of Grid applications based on
the specifications within a JDL entry, and if successful will acknowledge the
take-over of the Grid job to the WMS. The job token is subsequently used by
the JA in order to authenticate and authorize requests during the Grid job’s
execution.
Once a Grid job is taken by a JA, the JA creates a local temporary working
directory for the job, downloads its executable and input files according to
the LFNs specified in the JDL entry and executes the job as an operating
system process on the WN. During the Grid job’s execution, the JA sends
monitoring and resource utilization information to the WMS. The JA will
not interfere with a Grid job’s execution except the job exceeds its resource
utilization limits, which will trigger the JA to terminate the job’s processes.
Upon successful execution of a Grid job, the JA will try to upload the output
files to SEs and delete the local temporary working directory of the Grid
job. Throughout its lifetime, a JA continuously processes Grid jobs one after
another, including Grid job’s submitted by different users. For performance
reasons, the registration of output files in the file catalog is finally processed
by a central service for every successfully executed job.
The file catalog and SE access concerning executable and input files
before a job’s execution, as well as the file access for specified output files,
is thereby authenticated and authorized based on the job token, allowing
the JA to impersonate as the Grid job submitter. Similarly, a running Grid
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job is able to access the file catalog using the job token via the ROOT AliEn
Interface (see Section 3.1.2), where it is used to authenticate and authorize
request to the central API service, again based on impersonation of the Grid
job submitter. A running Grid job as a plain operating system process on
the WN is further able to utilize the network and Internet connection of the
WN, e.g. in order to retrieve or send data to remote entities.
3.2 Alternative Architectures
Within the following sections, the architecture of the ALICE Grid Services,
as presented in the previous section, will be compared to alternative archi-
tectures of other e-Science Grid infrastructures and projects.
3.2.1 LHC Experiments
Within their association in the WLCG project (see Section 2.1.3), the Grid
environments of the four big LHC experiments, ALICE, ATLAS, CMS and
LHCb, are based on a common collaboration of computing centers as their
Sites and share the same architecture concerning fabric and tiers: each
of the four VOs uses Site-provided SEs as storage sub-systems, Site WNs
accessible via Computing Elements and dedicated VOBoxes for VO-specific
Site services (see Section 3.1). The common authentication mechanisms
for service access are X.509 certificates and X.509 proxy certificates for all
four infrastructures. Also all four infrastructures are based on the pilot
job approach, while access to Sites’ Computing Elements is granted via
a dedicated X.509 proxy certificate allowing to submit pilot jobs to Sites’
resource management systems (see also Section 3.1.4) [103, 39, 62]. Within
the Grid infrastructures of ATLAS, CMS and LHCb, the data access to SEs is
authenticated and authorized based on Grid user’s X.509 proxy certificates
[96], in contrast to the proprietary SE access protocol in ALICE (see Section
3.1.3).
The four Grid infrastructures are finally based on different central Grid
middlewares, and consequently different central Grid services. Therefore,
the Grid architectures of the VOs of ATLAS, CMS and LHCb are each
shortly analyzed and compared to the architecture of the ALICE Grid Ser-
vices within the following paragraphs:
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ATLAS The Grid infrastructure of the ATLAS experiment is based on
the distributed data management system Don Quixote 2 (DQ2) [55] and a
Grid job layer provided by Distributed Production and Distributed Analysis
System for ATLAS (PanDA) [98, 103].
The Grid data layer is established by a set of logical data repositories
through the Don Quixote 2 (DQ2) [55] central service. The data layer uses
Datasets and Containers as logical aggregations [81]: a Dataset represents
a logical collection of Grid files, e.g. due to a common signification of
respective data, and Containers are logical collections of Datasets, while
e.g. different Datasets may refer to the same Grid file. The central catalogs
contain all Container and Dataset information and Grid file entries. A file
entry is based on LFN, GUID and an SE name as a reference to the file’s
physical location. The central catalogs contain no physical file location or
PFN, while Site services provide local replica catalogs, mapping the logical
file information to physical file entries on a Site’s SEs.
Data transfers are based on a central subscription catalog [55, 134], to
which transfer requests are submitted. Executed by dedicated Site-based
services, data transfers operate physically on file entries yet are logically
organized based on Dataset subscriptions.
Within the Grid job layer, PanDA is based on a single central queue
for Grid jobs and provides interfaces for job submission and management.
PanDA triggers on-demand transfers of Datasets to a Site via DQ2 upon
necessity due to Grid jobs scheduled to be executed at a respective Site.
Necessary Grid file data is then copied to the working directory of Grid
job before its startup. Once a Grid job finishes, output files are copied from
the working directory to a local Site SE and registered asynchronously [100,
72], authenticated and authorized based on the pilot job’s X.509 proxy
certificate [103].
Grid Applications utilizable within Grid jobs are either provided stat-
ically via Site-specific shared file systems or retrieved via the CernVM-FS
network file system [89].
CMS The Grid infrastructure of the CMS experiment is based on a Grid
data layer provided by the Dataset Bookkeeping Service and the Data Location
Service [39], and a Grid job layer established by the CMS Remote Analysis
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Builder [39, 68].
The CMS Grid data layer is based on a cascaded set of logical file catalogs,
with one global file catalog provided as a central DBS instance and further
Dataset Bookkeeping Service (DBS) instances or other logical file catalogs
existing as local Site-based services. The Data Location Service offers look-
ups of file entries stored within the DBS instances [73], with the central DBS
instance containing only logical file data referring to Site entries as their
physical data location [73]. The physical file data location is stored within
the Site-based catalogs.
A data management service called Phedex enables the submission of
transfer requests, providing the replication or movement of data. The
mechanism operates on datasets as aggregations of logical files, with physical
transfers being executed referring to file entries [39].
The CMS Grid job layer established by the CMS Remote Analysis Builder
provides one central task queue, facilitating unified submission of Grid jobs
requests. Grid jobs are scheduled and split according to input data proximity,
while their propagation to Sites is based on glideInWMS [118]. Grid job
output files are uploaded only to local SEs based on the same Site, and are
registered logically on the Site’s local DBS instance. The logical information
is then propagated to the global DBS asynchronously [43].
Grid applications for Grid jobs are stored on a Site-based shared file
systems, viz. all Grid applications are pre-installed with respect to a Grid
job execution [39].
LHCb The central Grid middleware of the LHCb Grid infrastructure
is DIRAC (Distributed Infrastructure with Remote Agent Control) [42], a central
Grid middleware establishing both a Grid data and Grid job layer.
The DIRAC File Catalog consists of a set of central catalogs, providing
logical information on Grid files and their physical replicas as well as ad-
ditional meta data [120, 62]. File entries in the catalogs are based on LFN,
GUID and PFN entries, specifying all logical data information centrally.
Data management is provided by a central transfer queue, called the Request
Management System, which receives textual transfer requests and propagates
these to distributed transfer agents.
The DIRAC Grid job layer provides a central task queue, an integrated
workload management system and its own pilot job implementation [64].
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3.2.2 An Example in Biomedical Research
In [119], a biomedical research Grid portal is presented. Consistently with
the WLCG scenario, the portal refers to an underlying Grid infrastructure
providing SEs and WNs accessible via Computing Elements. Within the
Grid data layer one central logical Grid file catalog with a file-based data
management provides a unified Grid file system for its users. Users can
further submit Grid jobs to a centralized queue, which are consequently
propagated to WNs utilizing the pilot job model.
3.3 An e-Science Grid Architecture
Within this section, a generic Grid architecture will be defined, based on
the commonalities of the ALICE Grid Services and its AliEn Grid middle-
ware and the presented alternative architectures. The generic architecture
will provide a reference framework and a standardized terminology for the
remainder of this document, and will be hereafter referred to as e-Science
Grid architecture. Within this section, defined and hereinafter utilized terms
will be indicated as italic bold text.
Overview and Fabric A distributed Grid layer is established based on
central components and services, hereafter referred to as Central Grid Ser-
vices, and computing centers as resource providers, hereafter referred to
as Sites. A Virtual Organization (VO) or e-Science VO, as the operator of a
Grid layer, provides and maintains the Central Grid Services. Computing
centers as Sites provide storage and computing infrastructure as Storage
Elements (SEs) and Worker Nodes (WNs). All services and entities are as-
sumed to be based on sub-systems with discretionary access controlled
Linux operating systems or analogous Unix-like operating systems.
The different services and entities are connected via private, shared and
public networks, whereas the connections between clients and central Grid
Services and between Central Grid Services and Site-based Grid services is
by default assumed to be Internet-based.
Access control Access within the Grid layer is authenticated using X.509
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certificates or derived X.509 proxy certificates and a set of trusted root cer-
tificates. Authorization is based on records provided and maintained via
dedicated directories or services.
Grid data layer Within the Grid data layer, one or several Grid File Cata-
logs establish unified virtual Grid file systems as logical structures. A logical
file entry in a Grid file system is referred to as a Logical File Name (LFN)
entry. An LFN entry is either correlated to a Physical File Name (PFN)
entry, specifying a physical file location on an SE or external resources, or
to logical entries in another Grid File Catalog, while the latter accounts for
potentially cascaded Grid File Catalogs. Further, an LFN can be linked to
several PFNs in a 1 to n relation as a file stored in n physical replicas. The
authorization of access to the Grid file system is based on ownership and
permission attributes of the logical Grid File Catalog entries.
In order to enable a delegated replication or movement of physical data,
Grid transfers can be submitted as predefined textual specifications to a
Grid Transfer Queue. Grid transfers are submitted to and executed by dis-
tributed Grid Transfer Agents, referring to the PFN entries of respective file
entries in the Grid File Catalog.
Grid job layer Within the Grid layer, Grid jobs can be submitted by Grid
users as predefined textual specifications to a Grid Task Queue, where they
are validated and processed. The processing may include transformations
of an initial job submission, such as the splitting into multiple job requests,
according to pre-defined rule sets.
The Grid Task Queue provides workload management functionality and
maintains the scheduling and matchmaking of Grid jobs and WNs.
Site WNs are dynamically integrated into the Grid job layer by VO-
specific services referred to as Grid Job Agents, which receive a fraction of a
WN’s computational capabilities for a limited time, establish a connection
to its Grid infrastructure and advertise the provided capabilities. Due to
Grid Job Agents, previously unknown WNs are dynamically integrated into
the virtual Grid layer for the lifetime of the respective Grid Job Agent. Grid
Job Agents receive Grid job requests from a Grid Task Queue and maintain
their execution as operating system processes on the WN. Therefore, the
Grid job requests sent to Grid Job Agents must be self-contained statements,
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specifying explicitly the executable as well as necessary files, preconditions
and target locations for their output. The Grid Job Agent is conceptionally
assumed to execute a Grid job on behalf of a respective Grid job submitter
or Grid user, and will erase any remaining data of the job, after its runtime.
Furthermore, WNs are assumed to have a direct connection to the Internet
that can be utilized by a Grid job. A Site’s resource management is assumed
to be encapsulated by a Site-service, provided and managed by the VO, re-
ferred to as a Grid Site Agent. The Grid Site Agent is running on a dedicated
Site-based computing system, referred to as the VOBoxes, and maintains
the submission of Grid Job Agent requests to a Site’s resource management
system.
Software appliances Using a predefined scope of available software ap-
plications, hereafter referred to as Grid Applications, Grid job requests can
specify software requirements and consequently presume their availability
on a WN during execution. These Grid Applications are either statically
available on a Site or WN, or are installed on a WN on demand before a
respective Grid job’s execution. The on-demand installation is assumed to
be triggered and processed by a Grid Job Agent. The necessary packages
are available via a data repository accessible within the Grid layer, e.g. the
Grid file catalog.
User interfaces Grid users can connect to the Grid layer via Grid Client
Interfaces, providing access to the Grid file systems and allowing to submit
and manage Grid jobs. Grid users are technically unrestricted to upload
any data, including program code as data, to the Grid file system or to
register data provided by external sources. They are equally free to specify
the utilization or execution of any Grid file system entries within Grid jobs,
provided that accesses to these entities are authorized.
3.4 Summary
A generic e-Science Grid architecture has been defined in this chapter, based
on the comparison of the specified architecture of the ALICE Grid Services
and other existing and instantiated e-Science Grid infrastructures.
34 Chapter 3. E-Science Grid Architectures
According to the defined architecture, a virtual Grid layer is established
by logical abstraction and within the framework of a VO, connecting a
multitude of sub-systems as services and clients via uncontrolled networks,
including the Internet. Collaborating institutes as Sites provide computing
and storage infrastructure as Worker Nodes and Storage Elements, which
are logically unified within a set of Central Grid Services, most importantly
providing Grid File Catalogs and Grid Task Queues. Grid users are provided
with access to virtual Grid file systems, established by Grid File Catalogs
and Site-provided Storage Elements as physical storage devices. Further
on, Grid users are provided with access to computational resources via the
submission of tasks as predefined textual requests, hereinafter referred to
as Grid jobs, to Grid Task Queues. These are subsequently distributed to
Site-provided Worker Nodes and executed without a user’s interference or
attention.
This architecture will be utilized hereinafter as the reference architecture
for e-Science Grids.
"We can only see a short distance
ahead, but we can see plenty there
that needs to be done."
Alan Turing
4
Security Analysis of e-Science Grids
In this chapter a security analysis of an e-Science Grid infrastructure will be
presented, referring to an instantiation of the previously defined e-Science
scenario (see Section 2.3) and e-Science Grid architecture (see Section 3.3).
After a discussion of related work, the involved players and security
characteristics of an e-Science Grid as well as potential attacker motives will
be analyzed and specified. Taking further into account the defined assets
(see Section 2.4) of the e-Science scenario, the analysis will conclude with
the definition of security objectives as general assessment criteria and the
security demand necessary to be achieved.
Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been presented in [PUB5,
PUB7, PUB9, PUB10].
4.1 Related Work
Within this section, selected related work concerning Grid security analyses
and the identification and specification of security issues and objectives will
be presented.
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In [78], Grid security requirements are assessed to potentially include
authentication, access control, integrity, privacy and non-repudiation. Further-
more, the following constraints are presented: single sign-on, protection of user
credentials, interoperability with local security solutions, exportability of code and
a consequent infeasibility of ordinary encryption, uniform credentials/certifica-
tion infrastructure, support for secure group communication as the information
exchange of computational processes, and support for multiple implementa-
tions with respect to security policies. A Grid security policy is defined, based
on trust domains as logical and administrative structures governed by a local
security policy, summarized as follows: a Grid environment is established
on multiple trust domains with heterogeneous sets of users, resources and
local security policies. Thereby interactions between different domains are
required to be consistent with all affected local security policies. Subjects
within the Grid environment have a global and a local representation requir-
ing their mapping between the global and each local trust domain. While
the authentication of a global subject and its subsequent mapping to a local
subject is required to be equivalent to the local authentication of the respec-
tive local subject, access control occurs only on local scope based on local
subjects. Finally, mutual authentication of interacting entities belonging to
different trust domains is required, and processes may be delegated subsets
of user permissions in order to act on their behalf.
In [61], security issues concerning Grid environments are identified
as Grid user management and accounts, missing user accountability with
respect to behavior and system usage, in particular due to the usage of
user-provided code.
In [123], security issues concerning on-demand Grids with large numbers
of unknown users are specified as follows: secure application deployment,
worker node sandboxing, middleware separation, secure service deployment and
secure workflow execution. Furthermore in [121, 122], a security analysis
concerning on-demand Grid and cluster computing identifies authentication,
authorization, delegation, confidentiality, secure communications, data availability
and auditing as primary security challenges. A defined scenario considers
three types of actors, which are resource providers, solution producers and users.
Solution producers supply software solutions and data to their users and
utilize the resource provider’s infrastructure for user-requested processing.
The utilization of third party code and the possible requirement of a solution
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producer’s root access to a resource provider’s infrastructure are pointed
out as particular security issues in on-demand Grid and cluster computing.
Moreover, a dissolved differentiation of internal and external attackers is
stated based on potential masquerading of external attackers, the possible
use of third party code as well as possible collusion of insiders and external
attackers. Three levels of security and trust requirements are defined for
on-demand Grid and cluster computing environments. Thereby users are
always required to trust their solution producer, while lateral or side by side
operating users and solution producers require no mutual trust, sharing a
resource provider’s infrastructure. In the first trust level, a resource provider
is required to trust the solution producers, concerning the non-malicious
usage of their environment, with virtualization on resource-provider-side
as a presented approach for solution. Also, in the first two levels users
as well as solution producers are required to trust resource providers to
correctly protect data and processing, which is assumed to be overcome by
integration of trusted computing platforms.
In [66], a taxonomy of Grid computing security issues is presented, defin-
ing the three initial categories of host level, architecture level and credential level.
The first category is further divided into data protection and job starvation,
the second one into information security, policy mapping and denial of service.
Concerning the first category, the authors briefly appoint different issues
with respect to the exposure of host systems to data and program code from
a priori unknown or untrustable entities and individuals. Virtualization and
sandboxing mechanisms are presented as examples of potential approaches
to these issues. Concerning information security, the category is subdivided
into secure communication, authentication, and single sign-on and delegation.
4.2 Players and Relationships
According to the defined e-Science scenario (see Section 2.3) and architecture
(see Section 3.3), an e-Science Grid is based on the interactions of three basic
groups of players: first, the Virtual Organization (VO) operators managing
the VO’s Grid layer and maintaining its Central Grid Services. Second, the
collaborating Sites as providers of storage and computing resources. And
third, the VO’s Grid users, utilizing the Grid layer. These three groups of
players represent different entities with respect to domains of control [75]
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from a technical perspective, while the group of Sites must be further item-
ized into each an own domain of control per Site. A VO can be embedded
Figure 4.1: e-Science Grid VO, entities and relations.
within umbrella organization (e.g. the WLCG) representing several VOs
with potentially common collaborating research institutions as Sites. In
general, Sites are assumed to provide their resources in a non-exclusive and
shared manner, viz. allowing any other VOs, organizations or user-groups
to access their resources. Accordingly, next to the three player types within
a VO, there are other VOs or organizations as adjacent or co-users of the
shared infrastructure. These represent an imaginary fourth group of players,
hereafter referred to as third parties. An example of the relations among the
three types of players of VO, Sites and users as well as the VO’s Central
Grid Services, an umbrella Grid organization and third parties as other VOs
are illustrated in Figure 4.1 as different overlapping layers.
4.3 Security Characteristics
In the following paragraphs, general security characteristics derived from
the e-Science Grid architecture will be presented and emphasized.
The connection of distributed systems and services within an e-Science
Grid includes the utilization of the Internet as a public network infrastruc-
ture or other shared and uncontrolled network infrastructures, leading to
the following first characteristic:
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Characteristic 4.1 Public communication environment Entities communi-
cate within a public and a priori insecure environment.
The physical control, administration and sovereignty of Site infrastruc-
ture as well as local scheduling decisions remain at the Site level and a Site is
free to share its facilities also with other parties (see Figure 4.1). Accordingly
the following characteristics are stated:
Characteristic 4.2 Discretionary control of providers Sites as resource
providers have the sovereignty and control over their infrastructure due to
both physical and administrative access.
Characteristic 4.3 Discretionary resource sharing The provision and shar-
ing of resources follows a Site’s decisions and mechanisms as a provider
and is only regulated via service level agreements.
Characteristic 4.4 Non-exclusive resources A Site’s resources are not pro-
vided exclusively to an e-Science Grid and as such are shared with other
consumers or users. Consequently interference with other consumers in the
course of the utilization of resources must be taken into consideration.
An e-Science Grid provides its users with access to WNs at its Sites based
on a Software as a Service or Platform as a Service layer, while users are
permitted to submit and thereby execute arbitrary program code and data.
Further, the payload submitted to WNs is assumed to be allowed to connect
to arbitrary locations via private, shared or public (Internet) networks, e.g.
in order to retrieve data or program code in the course of a Grid job’s execu-
tion. In line with this discretionary usage, users are assumed to be obliged
merely by policy to utilize the infrastructure only for the purpose of the ap-
proved research. E.g. the “Grid Acceptable Use Policy” [92] applied within
the WLCG as well as the “OSG VO Acceptable Use Policy” [108] require
any Grid user’s activity to be in line with the goals and objectives of the
respective VO. These aspects are summarized by the following characteristic:
Characteristic 4.5 Discretionary usage Grid users are allowed to intro-
duce arbitrary data and program code into the Grid layer as well as request
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and initiate their utilization or execution within Grid jobs. Grid jobs are
technically enabled to utilize Internet or other network access on a WN in a
discretionary manner.
A Grid user can utilize the Grid Client Interfaces to connect to the Grid
layer from any personal computing device, whereby a user’s control over
a respective device or system as well as the device’s or system’s integrity
cannot be assured, which is expressed by the following characteristic:
Characteristic 4.6 Uncontrolled client environment An e-Science VO has
no control of the Grid client environments nor can a Grid user’s sovereignty
and control over the respective computing system be taken for granted.
Due to the e-Science VO’s nature based on international collaboration
of different independent organizations and institutions, mutual relations
between participating entities must be respected. This is expressed by the
following last characteristic:
Characteristic 4.7 Cross-organizational access An e-Science Grid rep-
resents a conjunction or intersection of independent organizations or institu-
tions as legal entities in different countries or states. Hence, legal concerns,
like liability or due diligence, apply not only within the e-Science Grid as
such but as well mutually between each of the interacting entities.
4.4 Attacker Motives and Targets
Potential attackers’ motives and targets concerning an e-Science Grid must
be considered as a multidimensional issue due to an e-Science Grid’s cross-
organizational capacity (see Characteristic 4.7), its shared underlying infras-
tructure and the direct and indirect interconnections with other parties (see
Characteristic 4.3). This has e.g. particular impact on the differentiation
of insiders and outsiders, due to the overlapping and intersection of system
layers in an e-Science Grid. As an approach for understanding potential
adversaries’ view, attack motives and targets with respect to an e-Science
Grid are briefly classified as follows:
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Target 4.1 VO as primary target A motive targeting the primary mis-
sion of an e-Science VO as an intended interference with the operation or an
attempt to hinder a VO from carrying out its tasks is referred to as an attack
with the VO as the primary target.
Examples of such a motive could be to delete, alter or forge data or ob-
tain read access, to generally damage or influence services or to manipulate
a data taking process, in case of existing respective data sources.
Target 4.2 Secondary target A motive affecting though not directly target-
ing at the primary mission of an e-Science VO is referred to as an attack
with a secondary target. It can be further distinguished by targeting at either
individuals with a position or function within the VO including the VO’s
users, a Site within the VO, or any other third party the VO’s Grid layer or
operation is correlated with.
Assumed examples for a secondary target are an attacker trying to hin-
der VO members from doing their tasks or a potential usage of the system
as an interface or intermediary entity to access infrastructure or operations
of Sites or other VOs via a WN.
Target 4.3 System as a target Any otherwise motivated mission, e.g.
demand for wisdom or vandalism or exploitation of the Grid infrastructure
for any further agenda is referred to as an attack with the system as a target.
Here, an attack’s appearance could be equal or similar to the case of the VO
as the primary target or a secondary target, yet the actual motive would
be different. Considered examples of this case are the incorporation of
WNs as tools for attacks on any third parties via the Internet, or as well the
potentiality of simply the lust for destruction.
4.5 Security Objectives
Within this section, security objectives for an e-Science Grid will be defined,
derived from the combination of the previously specified assets (see Section
2.4) and the concerned players and their relationships (see Section 4.2), the
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specified characteristics (see Section 4.3) and potential attackers’ targets (see
Section 4.4). The objectives are considered to represent the central protection
goals of an e-Science Grid infrastructure and will be utilized hereinafter as
general assessment criteria.
The first objective concerns the assured integrity and attribution of data,
in particular concerning the discretionary control of Sites (see Characteristic
4.2), the cross-organization level of access (see Characteristic 4.7) and the
discretionary usage (see Characteristic 4.5):
Objective 4.1 Data integrity, authenticity and authorship The integrity
and authenticity of all data must be ensured and potential violations are
required to be identifiable. The authorship and provenance of any data must
be recorded, providing verifiable and non-repudiable information.
Illegitimate system access signifies potential damage to any of the de-
fined assets and must therefore be prevented. Considering potential attack-
ers’ motives (see Section 4.4) and consequently attacks from both outside
and inside the central infrastructure or its sub-systems, an e-Science Grid’s
protection must respect attacks on or exploitation of the Grid itself (see
Target 4.1 and Target 4.3) as well as attacks or side-effects of attacks on its
Sites, users or a third party (see Target 4.2). A further concern is the protec-
tion against proliferation of attacks, such as illegitimate access or attacks
on infrastructure or sub-systems spreading ’upwards’ or across the Grid
layer. Furthermore, users’ utilization of the e-Science Grid is required to be
restrictable, for instance by means of malicious or exceeding performance
interference. Finally, an e-Science Grid should be able to adapt to the avail-
ability, and potential service outages, of its Sites and any other relevant
infrastructure wherever possible.
Objective 4.2 System integrity An e-Science Grid and its infrastructure
must be accessible only to authorized members of the respective Virtual
Organization and be protected from any illegitimate access or alteration.
Objective 4.3 Availability An e-Science Grid and its infrastructure must
be protected against being generally affected or struck by Site-based con-
trol and illegitimate access by or attacks on Sites. Concerning according
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malfunctions and outages, a Grid layer is required to maintain operability
without affected sub-systems and Sites, and provide failover mechanisms
and protection against data loss.
With respect to potential attackers’ motives (see Section 4.4) and due to
an e-Science Grid’s characteristics of discretionary usage (see Characteristic
4.5), cross-organizational access (see Characteristic 4.7) and discretionary
control of Site-based sub-systems (see Characteristic 4.2), responsibilities and
liabilities of the involved parties become a further central security concern.
As a reference point, Grid policies applied within the Worldwide LHC
Computing Grid (WLCG) [35], the European Grid Infrastructure (EGI) [17]
and the Open Science Grid (OSG) [28] are considered.
The Grid Acceptable Use Policy [92, 114, 108], as applied within WLCG,
EGI and OSG, states a user’s liability for consequences of misbehavior or
security breaches. The Grid Security Policy [90, 115] further states the obliga-
tion of Grid users to protect their Grid credentials and their responsibility
for consequences of misuse of their credentials.
The Grid Security Traceability and Logging Policy [91, 116] declares the
following traceability requirement: ”The minimum level of traceability for Grid
usage is to be able to identify the source of all actions [. . . ] and the individual who
initiated them.”
Hence, an initial job submission of a Grid user and all its consecutive
modifications within the Grid layer must be each undeniably determinable.
In reply to these concerns the following objective is defined:
Objective 4.4 Non-repudiation of Grid jobs A Grid job’s authenticity
and origin must be verifiable at any later stage, facilitating non-repudiation
of a Grid user’s initial job submission, consecutively applied modifications
or transformations and its propagation for execution, even beyond the revo-
cation of a Grid user’s access and respective digital identities.
Data and meta information in an e-Science Grid must be generally as-
sumed to be private and must therefore be protected from unauthorized
access. Considering though the ALICE VO [1] as a reference point, it is
constituted by policy [47] that all data and code must be publicly available
to every member of the collaboration. Consequently any non-authorized
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access to the system represents a threat to data privacy, as within the system
there are no further control mechanisms foreseen.
Nevertheless, data protection efforts need to reflect the condition that
every member within the collaboration is technically capable of leaking any
information or data without permission, and thus must be trusted not to do
so. This relaxation of data privacy is not assumed, though, to be generally
appropriate or applicable, resulting in the following objective as a lower
limit for the herein-discussed general case of an e-Science Grid:
Objective 4.5 Confidentiality and data privacy Beyond access control
and prevention of illegitimate system access, the storage, transport and
processing of any e-Science Grid data or information must be protected
against unauthorized information retrieval, such as copying, eavesdropping,
sniffing or redirecting of data.
These five security objectives will be utilized hereinafter as general
assessment criteria and are considered to represent the security demand
necessary to be achieved within an e-Science Grid infrastructure.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, the involved players and their relationships, the security
characteristics as well as potential attack motives and targets with respect to
the defined e-Science scenario (see Section 2.3) and Grid architecture (see
Section 3.3) were analyzed and specified. Having further taken into account
the defined assets (see Section 2.4) of the e-Science scenario, derived security
objectives have been defined.
E-Science Grids are based on the interactions of three basic groups of
players: first, the Virtual Organization (VO) operators managing the VO’s
Grid layer, second, the collaborating Sites as providers, and third, the VO’s
Grid users. These three groups of players represent different entities with
respect to domains of control from a technical perspective, with the group
of Sites being further itemized into an own domain of control per Site. An
imaginary fourth group of players are third parties like other VOs or organi-
zations as adjacent or co-users of the shared infrastructure. Moreover, there
are umbrella Grid organizations in which several VOs can be embedded in.
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The security characteristics of an e-Science Grid have been defined as
its public communication environment, in particular the Internet, the dis-
cretionary controlled and non-exclusive Site-provided resources, the discre-
tionary usage by its users and uncontrolled client environments, and the
cross-organizational access within the infrastructure.
Three types of attack motivations and targets have been identified as a
VO and its mission as a primary target, secondary targets like individuals
and involved or adjacent organisations and entities, and third, the system
as a target as a demand for wisdom or vandalism or the exploitation of the
technical infrastructure.
The security objectives that have been consequently defined concern data
integrity and authenticity, system integrity, availability, non-repudiation of
Grid job submission and processing, and confidentiality and data privacy.
These security objectives represent an e-Science Grid’s security demand
necessary to be achieved and will be referred to in the remainder of this
document as general assessment criteria.
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"We cannot solve our problems with the same
thinking we used when we created them."
Albert Einstein
5
Vulnerability Analysis of the ALICE
Grid Services
In this chapter, selected vulnerabilities of the ALICE Grid Services and the
central Grid middleware AliEn will be presented (see Section 3.1), referring
to findings of the previous security analysis (see Chapter 4) and the defined
security objectives (see Section 4.5) as the assessment criteria. The vulnera-
bilities will be presented in three sections, concerning access control of the
Grid layer and the security of the Grid data and job layer.
The presented vulnerabilities will disclose the deficiencies of the ap-
proach of delegation by masquerade, and will thereby identify the Grid job
delegation within an e-Science Grid infrastructure as a central concern that
is necessary to be dealt with. The analysis of Grid job delegation will then
be pursued in the subsequent two chapters. Further on, the findings of this
chapter will be incorporated in the remainder of this document as lessons
learned and problems that have to be overcome.
Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been presented in [PUB3,
PUB4, PUB5].
48 Chapter 5. Vulnerability Analysis of the ALICE Grid Services
5.1 Grid Layer Access Control
The following four vulnerabilities concern the authentication and protection
of network-based communication in the Grid layer, the Grid services’ pro-
tection against external access and enforcement of authorization and access
control.
Vulnerability 5.1 Bypassable client authentication Up to AliEn version
2.18, the communication of Perl-based services and clients using the SOAP
protocol is not authenticated, allowing to use certain Grid layer functionality
in the name of any existing Grid user. As a consequence, it is e.g. possi-
ble to submit arbitrary Grid jobs using any existing identities without any
other restrictions than the impersonated Grid user’s permissions. A thereby
submitted Grid job cannot be distinguished from a legitimate Grid job and
will have full Grid layer access in the name of the impersonated Grid user
during its execution on a Worker Node (WN).
This vulnerability was proven in practice to be easily exploitable: the AliEn
Shell client interface initially attempts to establish an authenticated connec-
tion to the Grid layer’s central database system and terminates itself in case
the connection could not be established. By (small) modifications of the
interpreted Perl source code on client-side, the interface ignores the missing
database connection and successfully connects to central services without
any authentication of the request or the pretended username.
Vulnerability 5.2 Direct database connection Due to the direct database
connection of clients, malicious usage of database access as well as SQL code
injections via the AliEn client interfaces are feasible, leading to potential
damages and alterations of data.
Different uses of exploitation of this attack were proven in practice with
respect to the manipulation of data in the AliEn file catalog and task queue.
Vulnerability 5.3 Missing service authentication Up to AliEn version
2.18, the communication of any Perl-based services and clients via the SOAP
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protocol utilizes no authentication methods for services. This leaves the ser-
vices vulnerable to spoofing attacks, viz. clients might be fooled to connect
to and communicate with forged non-authentic services. This vulnerability
equally applies to the central API service, the MySQL database services, the
LDAP directory service as well as to Storage Elements (SEs) and supported
external data protocols, such as HTTP and SOAP.
Vulnerability 5.4 Interceptable communication Up to AliEn version 2.18,
the communication of any Perl-based services and clients via the SOAP pro-
tocol is not encrypted, which makes interception of these communications
possible. Again, this vulnerability equally applies to the communication
with the MySQL database service, with the LDAP directory service as well
as data communication with SEs and supported external data protocols,
such as HTTP and SOAP. Furthermore, the communication with the central
API service is only encrypted for client-to-service requests, while service-to-
client responses are transferred as plain text.
The missing protection of the communication of Perl-based services and
clients via the SOAP protocol and the service-to-client communication of the
API service facilitates the interception of the credentials (job tokens) utilized
for authentication and authorization of Grid jobs and the credentials to
access SEs.
The encryption of client-to-service requests to the API service is based on
the Advanced Encryption Standard with the session token as the encryption
key. The implementation allows a fully encrypted communication, which is
though disabled by default for performance reasons.
In the course of the security analyses of this thesis, these four vulner-
abilities were identified as major security threats and became thereupon
approached in a first stage: in AliEn version 2.19, mutual authentication
and encryption were introduced [PUB3] , yet only for SOAP-based connec-
tions to Central Grid services. The implementation uses the Apache [30]
web server as a service front end with mod_ssl [24] and mod_gridsite [20]
modules providing encrypted communication and mutual authentication
via X.509 host certificates and X.509 proxy certificates. The direct database
connection of clients and non-central services was replaced by an integration
of the respective data exchange into the SOAP-based communication.
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Vulnerability 5.5 Unprotected Grid user credentials The X.509 proxy cer-
tificates utilized for client authentication by the AliEn Perl Shell client, the
AliEn Shell client and the AliEn ROOT interface are not protected against
theft. Hence, arbitrary illegitimate utilization is possible during their period
of validity. The credentials are stored as plain-text information in file entries
in the operating system’s temporary folder and are only protected by the
file system’s POSIX-permissions.
Accordingly, once obtained X.509 proxy certificates can be utilized to access
the Grid layer from any other location. This facilitates identity-theft without
any further restrictions than the credentials’ validity, which is 12 hours by
default. The characteristics of X.509 proxy certificates are further analyzed
in Chapter 6.
5.2 Grid Data Layer Security
The vulnerabilities presented in the following apply to the Grid data layer of
the AliEn middleware up to version 2.18. Solutions and counter-measures
were presented in [PUB4, PUB5, PUB10], including their integration into
AliEn version 2.19, as an improved Grid data access protocol and are here-
inafter presented in Section 8.1.
In order to read or write a file on an SE accessible via the XRootD [36, 71]
protocol a client has to connect to an AliEn central service, called Authen, be-
forehand and retrieve a so called Access Envelope [74], containing a capability-
based ticket. An Access Envelope encloses the ticket together with a public-
key signature of a checksum of the ticket, based on RSA signatures and SHA1
checksums. Ticket and signature are protected by a Blowfish symmetric-key
encryption. The key used for the encryption is itself encrypted using a
public-key encryption and placed next to the encrypted ticket. The Access
Envelope’s structure requires two pairs of keys to be used as follows: the
Authen service signs the created ticket with its private key and encrypts
the Access Envelope using an SE’s public key. A SE receiving an Access
Envelope in the course of a request decrypts the Access Envelope using its
own private key and verifies the ticket inside using the Authen service’s
public key. The validity of the Access Envelope is limited by a creation and
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an expiration timestamp specified within the ticket.
The encryption of the Access Envelope enables a secret transmission of
information from the issuer to the final recipient, though this functionality is
actually avoided in AliEn. In order to permit informed decisions concerning
the data retrieval and detailed logging on client side, and since the ticket
contains no secret information with respect to the user or client, the access
ticket is additionally passed on as plaintext.
Figure 5.1 shows how the AliEn client interface retrieves and uses an
Access Envelope in the course of a write access, which is explained as
follows: The client sends a request specifying the Logical File Names (LFN)
or Global Unique Identifier (GUID) and the SE, file size and checksum to the
central Authen service. Upon successful authentication and authorization of
the request the Authen service replies with a digitally signed ticket inside an
encrypted Access Envelope. The client sends a write request including the
Access Envelope and the file data to the SE via the XRootD protocol. The SE
decrypts the Access Envelope and verifies the digital signature and content
of the ticket in order to authenticate and authorize the access, and executes
the write operation if applicable. After a successful write attempt the client
requests the status of the written file in order to confirm the existence and
size of the file. Finally, the client connects to the file catalog and registers the
file specifying all necessary parameters.
The read access to a file on an SE has an analogue procedure, with
an SE replying to the client the respective data of the file entry once the
authorization of an according Access Envelope was successful.
As to deletion, normal Grid user’s are only allowed to delete logical
entries in the file catalog according to their permissions. The mechanism of
Access Envelopes is though equally utilized in order to grant administrative
users and dedicated services permissions to delete physical file entries on
SEs.
The specified access protocol has several vulnerabilities, which are dis-
cussed as follows:
Vulnerability 5.6 Forgeable Grid files and attributions The creation of
Access Envelopes is fully controlled by the Authen service and relies on
the integrity of the service and the secrecy of the utilized keys, whereas
potentially forged or illegitimately modified Access Envelopes cannot be
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Figure 5.1: Writing a file in AliEn v2.18 using the SE access protocol.
identified or discovered. Furthermore, all logical file entries and file en-
try attributions, such as LFN, owner and permissions, are maintained as
simple value fields in the database of the file catalog. Again, this under-
mines identification or discovery of forged or illegitimately modified entries.
Consequently, everybody in possession of according privileges within cen-
tral computing systems is able to modify or forge Grid file entries as a whole
or Grid file attributions within the file catalog.
Grid users are further allowed to register arbitrary file entries in the file
catalog:
Vulnerability 5.7 Bypassable file ownership and permissions The file
registration in the file catalog is unverified concerning entry’s Physical File
Name (PFN), size and checksum, as well as ignoring any potentially existing
references to a specified PFN. The missing cross-checking of PFNs therefore
allows to bypass ownership and permissions of physical file entries by reg-
istration of already existing PFNs as new logical file entries in the file catalog.
By retrieving the PFN value of an existing file entry in the file catalog,
a Grid user is able to register a new file entry specifying this existing PFN,
which will result in a new file entry in the file catalog belonging to the user.
As permissions and ownership within the file catalog apply only to LFN
and GUID values, the Grid user will implicitly receive all permissions with
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respect to the physical file the PFN refers to, even if not entitled to write the
original logical file entry.
Vulnerability 5.8 Race conditions and physical file overwriting Since
the initial authorization in the course of an Access Envelope request is in-
dependent of the later file registration, race conditions concerning LFN or
GUID collisions may occur. In the latter case, overwriting of newly created
physical files is possible.
Consequently, once two clients attempt to create a new file with the same
LFN concurrently only the client registering the file entry as first in the file
catalog will be successful, even if the other client has requested an according
Access Envelope before. Moreover it is possible to overwrite a physical file
in the course of a file entry’s creation: during the generation of an Access
Envelope by the Authen service, the PFN of a new file entry is composed by
SE specific parameters plus its GUID, while a specific GUID value can be
optionally requested by a client. A user-specified GUID will be accepted,
if no registered file entry with the respective GUID exists within the file
catalog. Consequently, within the time frame of a physical file’s creation on
an SE and its logical registration in the file catalog it is possible to request
write access to the same GUID and SE and to overwrite the already existing
physical file. The loss of the original file data will thereby be only identified
once the respective file entry will be accessed later on. This affects e.g. the
output files of Grid jobs, within which the registration is deferred with
respect to the physical files’ creation on an SE (see Section 3.1.4).
Vulnerability 5.9 Client-trusted file identity and size The Authen ser-
vice never examines the physical content of a file and relies on the client’s
unverified declaration of a file entry’s checksum and size.
Accordingly the checksum and size entries within the file catalog are an
unreliable and insignificant reference concerning a file entry’s integrity and
a user’s file quota. Initially incorrect declarations cannot be distinguished
from later modifications of physical file data and fraud against the system’s
resource accounting is facilitated.
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Vulnerability 5.10 Untraceable alteration or loss of physical data Phys-
ical data of file entries can be lost, altered or data planted without later
identification or discovery, as checksums are not enforced within file opera-
tions.
Accordingly, modified or corrupted data will be utilized within the sys-
tem without notice. Only if multiple physical replicas of a file entry exist
and are inconsistent or if data is identified to be unusable in the course of its
processing, an alteration will be identified.
Vulnerability 5.11 Replay of Access Envelopes Access Envelopes are self-
sufficient with respect to SE accesses and have no further binding to the
Grid user or account in favor of which they were issued, yet are transmitted
over an interceptable connection (see Section 5.1). Within the time frame
of their validity, Access Envelopes can be utilized repeatedly as there is no
state of their utilization considered.
In case of read accesses an Access Envelope therefore allows any holder to
read a respective file entry on an SE during its validity.
Concerning write accesses, a flag in the Access Envelope indicates if the
credential either allows to create a new physical file entry on an SE, while
an SE is supposed to deny access, if a file with the specified PFN exists.
Hence, a replay of an Access Envelope will have no effect on an existing
physical file on SE. However, if by a malicious access a new file on an SE is
created before the genuine request, the genuine client’s request will fail and
an illegitimate file will be existing.
In case of an access for deletion of a physical file on an SE, a replay will
be without any effect. Yet again, the preempting of a deletion by illicit use
of an Access Envelope must be assumed as a damaging event, as the point
in time as well as the decision about the sending of the request would not
be controlled by the genuine client.
5.3 Grid Job Layer Security
The Grid job layer in the AliEn Grid middleware is most importantly es-
tablished on the approach of delegation by masquerade. Based on this
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approach, a Grid user submits Grid jobs to the VO’s Grid services and the
VO consecutively acts as a representative of its users. On Site-level, Grid
jobs of all of the VO’s users are executed in the name of the VO without any
further distinction, at which the VO represents an intermediary between its
users and Sites. In the course of a Grid job submission, a user performs an
implicit delegation of its Grid layer privileges to the VO.
Consistent with the case of Grid file system entries, the attribution of
Grid jobs in AliEn is maintained by textual entries, as e.g. the username.
These entries are stored within or next to the job’s JDL specification in the
central task queue.
Vulnerability 5.12 Misuse and forgery of Grid jobs Due to the usage
of delegation by masquerade, a Grid user’s privileges can be deliberately
and covertly misused at the level of central services or other processing
entities, as all relevant information is controlled by the VO.
Hence, on Site-level there is no further insurance of a correct execution
of a job beyond simple run time and resource utilization monitoring by the
AliEn JobAgent (JA). Grid users have no possibility to prove non-conformity
of the actions having taken place in their name and as such to protect the
misuse of their digital identity, including potential forgery of Grid jobs and
identity-theft. Due to the architecture of job submission and execution, it is
virtually impossible to state the origin of potential security incidents, attacks,
or misbehavior arising along or from a Grid job executed on a WN. A job
could potentially be forged or altered at any processing point between user
and WN or on the WN itself, while an alteration’s origin cannot be identified
and possibly not even the consequences or the alteration as such.
A JA on a WN executes all Grid jobs as received on behalf of the VO,
in which the jobs are executed directly by the JA process and therefore run
within the same user environment in the WN’s operating system, leading to
the following two vulnerabilities:
Vulnerability 5.13 Exposure of the JobAgent and missing Grid job isola-
tion Grid jobs are not encapsulated or isolated, neither with respect to the
JA service nor mutually, and are therefore able to tamper with the JA or
other Grid jobs.
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By malicious alteration of a JA, Grid jobs consecutively processed by the JA
can be accessed and modified. A JA runs only one Grid job at a time and a
job’s working directory is scratched after the execution. Nevertheless, a job
can also fork sub-processes that will remain active after the job’s execution,
which are able to alter consecutively executed jobs.
Vulnerability 5.14 Exposure of the JobAgent’s credential As the JA’s X.509
proxy credential has no protection itself (see Chapter 6) and the JA is nei-
ther protected against access from Grid jobs, the credential can be directly
obtained or utilized by any Grid job.
The privileges of the credential allow to impersonate any of the VO’s Grid
users without restrictions. Consequently, a Grid job can start e.g. a Grid
client interface on the WN, utilizing the X.509 proxy credential for authenti-
cation and authorization. Moreover, the credential could be sent out to other
locations via Internet or be uploaded to the Grid file system and consecu-
tively retrieved. With an initial validity of several hours (see Section 3.1.4),
the limitation in time can thereby not be assumed as an actual protection
against misuse.
Vulnerability 5.15 Impossible differentiation of Grid job origins Grid
jobs originating from different users are not visible to Sites and a WN’s
operating system.
Hence, from a Site’s perspective all Grid jobs of a VO correlate to one digital
identity and it is not possible to differentiate Grid jobs in a transparent way.
In case of security incidents or attacks, potential counter-measures can only
affect all Grid jobs of a concerned VO.
5.4 Summary
Selected vulnerabilities of the ALICE Grid Services and the central Grid
middleware AliEn have been presented in this chapter, concerning access
control of the Grid layer and the security of the Grid data and job layer.
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In summary, the ALICE Grid Services and its AliEn Grid middleware
have strong architectural security deficiencies with respect to inbound and
outbound protection and the authenticity of object entities and interactions
within the established Grid layer. This is due to the reliance on unverifiable
information concerning authenticity and authorship, and the utilization of
delegation by masquerade with respect to Grid job processing and execution.
The latter facilitates for instance unverifiable misuse of Grid user privileges
and digital identities. Finally, privileged credentials on the WN are not
protected against access or retrieval by executed Grid jobs. As a result, it
is not possible to achieve the afore-defined security objectives (see Section
4.5).
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”Your messages I hear, but faith has not been given”
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
6
Analysis of Delegation and X.509
Proxy Certificates
In the previous chapter (see Chapter 5), the approach of delegation by mas-
querade as applied within the ALICE Grid Services implied fundamental
deficiencies. However, the aspect of delegation represents a central concern
within an e-Science Grid infrastructure that is necessary to be dealt with.
Therefore, within this chapter X.509 proxy certificates [132] as a widely
adopted mechanism for delegation of privileges will be analyzed in detail
and their shortcomings and limitations will be specified.
First, the concept of delegation in the context of Grid computing will
be investigated and two conceptual approaches will be distinguished, with
the first approach being delegation by masquerade as applied within the
ALICE Grid Services. With respect to the second advantageous approach
of a transparent delegation, X.509 proxy certificates will be analyzed as an
alleged mechanism for an according implementation. An examination of
the thereby necessary handling and propagation of X.509 proxy certificates
as delegation credentials within a Grid layer will identify several cardinal
vulnerabilities.
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Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been presented in [PUB5,
PUB7, PUB10].
6.1 Delegation in Grid Computing
In essence, delegation in Grid computing occurs once Grid jobs are handled
by Grid services and finally executed on Worker Nodes (WNs). Referring to
the defined e-Science scenario (see Section 2.3) and e-Science Grid architec-
ture (see Section 3.3), Grid users submit job requests to a Grid layer, which
are consecutively processed by Central Grid Services and are thereby in the
sovereignty of the respective Virtual Organization (VO). Upon submission
of these processed job requests to WNs on a Site, the VO acts as a delegatee,
demanding the Grid jobs’ execution on behalf of the respective Grid users.
Such a case of delegation is not limited to the case of Grid jobs and could
also be necessary for other tasks requested by a user to be processed within
the Grid, such as data transfer requests. To simplify matters, this chapter
will focus on the delegation of Grid jobs, since delegations of other tasks are
assumed to represent analogous or less complex scenarios.
An implementation of Grid job or task delegation can be classified ac-
cording to two basic scenarios as follows: in the first scenario, a VO acts
with respect to its Sites or resource and service providers as a proxy and
representative of its Grid users. Grid jobs or tasks of all users are executed
on WNs or service endpoints using a digital identity representing the respec-
tive VO as a whole. Accordingly, the VO masquerades as its users and the
actual digital identities of submitters can only be resolved via an accounting
or information provided by the VO. Hence, Grid jobs or tasks submitted by
different Grid users cannot be distinguished directly at Site-level or on a
WN. This approach is utilized e.g. in the ALICE Grid Service’s middleware
AliEn, with its deficiencies having been specified in Section 5.3.
In the second scenario, a Grid job or task is separately authenticated on
Site- or provider-level using a credential on a WN or service endpoint before
its execution, indicating and assuring the corresponding submitter’s digital
identity to the Site or provider. Moreover, the credentials are used on WNs
or service endpoints to grant access to external services for a Grid job or task,
e.g. to download and or upload data, with the intention to transparently
authenticate and authorize such requests based on the submitter’s identity.
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The two concepts are defined as follows:
Definition 6.1 The delegated execution of a Grid job or task based on mas-
querading of users as unidentifiable submitters is referred to as a masquerade-
based delegation.
Definition 6.2 Delegated execution of a Grid job or task facilitating the au-
thentication of a submitter’s identity and the consequent requests is referred
to as a transparent user delegation.
The definitions are used hereafter in order to evaluate the utilization
of X.509 proxy credentials and alternative mechanisms as approaches for
transparent user delegation in comparison to the simpler masquerade-based
delegation approach.
6.2 X.509 Proxy Certificates
The basic idea of X.509 proxy certificates [133, 132] is to provide single
sign-on and delegation while not exposing the private key corresponding
to a respective X.509 certificate [69], and to rather issue credentials of lower
order, most importantly proposed and implemented in the Globus Security
Infrastructure [78, 60].
An X.509 proxy certificate contains a public key (of a private/public key
pair) signed with a private key corresponding to either an X.509 certificate
or another X.509 proxy certificate. Next to the signed public key, the X.509
proxy certificate further contains the X.509 certificate or a respective chain
of cascaded X.509 proxy certificates plus the X.509 certificate the chain is
derived from, wherein one certificate asserts its successor by a signature.
An X.509 proxy certificate and the corresponding private key together are
hereafter referred to as a proxy credential.
Proxy credentials as applied for instance within the WLCG are based on
unrestricted delegation, although the mechanism itself would allow further
functionality, such as including specifications or limitations of its usage.
Unrestricted delegation based on proxy credentials has though long-known
cardinal security deficiencies [101], which have already been considered
in the initial proposal for X.509 proxy certificates [133]. These deficiencies
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are defined and specified as limitations with respect to Grid computing as
follows:
Limitation 6.1 Unrestricted delegation A unrestricted delegation is given
wherever the delegation has no other dependency than in the dimension of
time. This is the case if a proxy credential contains no explicitly specified
limitation. Within its validity, a proxy credential then allows only for a full
delegation to a delegatee, which consequently holds all privileges of the
delegator.
Limitation 6.2 Unconditional delegation A proxy credential without fur-
ther qualifications has neither any binding to a particular delegatee nor any
context-sensitivity of its usage as any privilege is held as such.
In summary, a plain proxy credential neither specifies what is delegated nor
to whom or in what context, and virtually represents a copy of an X.509
certificate which is identifiable as such and has a shortened validity in time
with respect to the original X.509 certificate.
Any further limitation or qualification would though require additional
mechanisms capable of interpreting and processing such qualifications of a
proxy credential accordingly, and reject authentication or authorization in
case of unknown specifications.
An extension to the X.509 proxy mechanism called Virtual Organization
Membership Service (VOMS) [65] provides the possibility to apply autho-
rization attributes to a proxy credential. Upon authentication using a valid
proxy credential it is possible to request a VOMS service to provide a new
derived proxy credential containing additional attributes which the respec-
tive proxy holder is entitled to use. These attributes can define e.g. a VO
membership or roles and the mechanism prevents an attribute’s value from
being altered once set within a proxy credential.
Additional mechanisms like VOMS can provide further restrictions to
the use of proxy credentials, if plain proxy credentials without extensions
grant no critical permissions. However e.g. within the WLCG environment,
VOMS extensions are primarily used to elevate the privileges of a proxy
credential holder, e.g. to obtain the necessary role to run a pilot job (see
Section 3.1.4). Thus, any holder of a plain proxy credential can request a
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new set of VOMS extensions within the range of privileges of the original
certificate owner, and thereby escalate the level of privileges.
In [66], the necessity of additional specifications for X.509 proxy-based
delegation is pointed out, while indicating policies and rules based on the
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [105] or the Extensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) [104] as potential solutions.
Also in [53], the mismatch of requested processing and delegated priv-
ileges is identified, while referring to a least-privilege delegation as the
optimal scenario. As an approach for solution the consolidation and unifica-
tion of the languages utilized for the expression of jobs and resources and
the consecutively necessary privilege specifications are proposed.
Limitation 6.3 Exposure to theft A proxy credential is by itself completely
unprotected while being passed on within a distributed environment, such
as an e-Science infrastructure.
Concerning this aspect of theft, a proxy credential is comparable to a plain
security token. Without additional protection a proxy credential can be
stolen at any location it is in use and must be expected to be accessible
at least by persons with administrative or privileged access. Moreover, a
proxy credential’s validity of e.g. hours or days cannot be considered to
successfully prohibit an exploitation by potential attackers.
Limitation 6.4 Multiple domain validity Since a X.509 certificate can
be signed by more than one VO or any other institution, a corresponding
proxy credential can as well be valid to access all these VO’s or institution’s
infrastructures and resources as granted by the original X.509 certificate.
This presumes that different VOs and institutions equally recognize a proxy
credential. Which could though at least be expected within umbrella Grid
organizations and is e.g. the case within the WLCG, where it particularly
concerns users with administrative functions in several VOs. Accordingly,
the protection of proxy credentials must be an objective in all concerned
VOs, and the organization maintaining the lowest security level will denote
a lower boundary to all other organizations.
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6.3 Propagation of X.509 Proxy Certificates
An adoption of X.509 proxy certificates (proxy credentials) for delegation
implies introducing mechanisms for storage, handling and propagation of
the credentials within a Grid layer. Within the following paragraphs, differ-
ent mechanisms and approaches will be presented and analyzed, and two
alternative approaches of usage and propagation of X.509 proxy certificates
will be identified.
The credential management service MyProxy [51, 93] maintains proxy
credentials after their initial upload and issues derived proxy credentials of
lower validity to authorized entities on demand. Thus, a delegator uploads
a mid-term proxy credential, having e.g. a validity of one month, to the
service while specifying a password. A delegatee in possession of either the
password or an equivalent (still) valid proxy credential can then request a
short-term proxy credential, e.g. 24 hours, from the service. Moreover, a
delegator can renew the proxy credential stored within the service, in order
to enlarge the procedure beyond the initial time frame. Hence, in theory a
proxy credential can be endlessly extended in time.
In [103], an implementation of a transparent user delegation in the
PanDA (see Section 3.2) Grid job framework is presented: based on a
MyProxy service, the Grid Client Interface uploads a Grid user’s proxy
credential to the service while specifying a random password. The pass-
word is sent by the client to the VO’s Central Grid Services upon Grid job
submission, where it is stored. Whenever a Grid job of the respective user
is sent by the Central Grid Services to a WN for execution, the password is
attached to the Grid job and used by the Grid Job Agent on the WN to re-
trieve the corresponding user’s proxy credential from the MyProxy service.
Definition 6.3 An approach in which a VO holds keys with a one-to-one
relation to its users’ proxy credentials is hereafter referred to as an indirect
user proxy propagation.
Within the Grid job framework DIRAC (see Section 3.2), transparent
user delegation is implemented based on direct storage of proxy credentials
within Central Grid Services [63, 95, 110]. The framework contains mecha-
nisms analogous to the MyProxy service, wherein a Grid Client Interface
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uploads a Grid user’s proxy credential to the Central Grid Services, which
then issues derived proxy credentials of lower validity to its Grid services.
Consequently, a Grid Job Agent on a WN receives a Grid user’s proxy cre-
dential directly from the Central Grid Services once it receives a request to
execute a Grid job.
Another example of this approach is the Charité Grid Portal [135]: there,
Grid user proxy credentials are stored within the portal’s services. Proxy
credentials of lower validity are issued on demand in order to allow the
portal to act in the name of the user while submitting requests to the Grid
infrastructure below.
Definition 6.4 The approach of storage within a VO’s sovereignty and
direct transfer of user proxy credentials is hereafter referred to as a direct
user proxy propagation.
Further, the GEO Grid [117] Portal middleware utilizes a MyProxy service
in order to store and maintain proxy credentials of Grid users protected
by passwords. Users send the respective passwords via an interface to the
middleware in the course of system usage, which consecutively obtains and
utilizes proxy credentials. The portal is based on a VO-controlled instance
of a GAMA [54] service, which creates and manages proxy credentials,
while users never directly obtain or control their proxy credentials and only
utilize passwords to authenticate at the portal. Hence, this is assumed as an
example of an escalated case of a VO’s direct access to Grid user credentials.
6.4 X.509 Proxy-based Grid Job Delegation
Without comprehensive additional mechanisms the specified limitations of
X.509 proxy certificates (proxy credentials) based on unrestricted delegation
lead to fundamental weaknesses. An adoption as a mechanism for trans-
parent user delegation introduces severe security vulnerabilities, which are
defined and specified as follows:
Vulnerability 6.1 Unverifiable correlation of assignment and delegation
A proxy credential does not have any binding to any actual Grid job or task.
The availability or presence of a Grid user’s proxy credential is no binding
66 Chapter 6. Analysis of Delegation and X.509 Proxy Certificates
statement assuring the authenticity of a Grid job or its sound processing.
Consequently, proxy credentials can be potentially stolen, misused or mixed
up without notice at various points between the user’s job submission and
a WN. Similarly the description or payload of a job could be altered or
exchanged. In [85] this concern was raised as the necessity to trust a VO
to provide flawless correlations between proxy credentials and Grid jobs.
Hence, the use of proxy credentials is not able to fulfill the security objectives
of authenticity and non-repudiation of Grid jobs (see Section 4.5).
Vulnerability 6.2 Fuzzy validity and expiration The validity in time of a
proxy credential is by itself independent of the validity or lifetime of a Grid
job or any other submitted task.
Proxy credentials are propagated and stored at several services within a
Grid layer, once a Grid user interacts with the system and submits e.g. Grid
jobs. In the event of all Grid jobs or tasks of a user being terminated, cor-
responding proxy credentials within the Grid layer must be assumed to
be still valid, at least in case of any intended storage of proxy credentials.
The user has though no control over their deletion or invalidation and can
generally not prevent their misuse.
Vulnerability 6.3 High dependence on VO and Sites and challenge of pro-
tection The access of a VO and Sites to Grid user credentials enables misuse
by personal or attackers and the protection of proxy credentials during prop-
agation or at rest becomes a critical concern.
Even if proxy credentials are never stored or processed within a VO’s Cen-
tral Grid services, as in case of the indirect user proxy propagation, a user
or administrator holding certain privileges within the VO must still be con-
sidered as being able to obtain Grid users’ proxy credentials, e.g. via access
to necessary passwords. Moreover, a Grid job submitter’s proxy credential
will be accessible e.g. by the Grid Job Agent on a WN and consequently,
everybody with according access to such system entities will be able to
retrieve these proxy credentials. Thus, both system administrators as well
as successful attackers of entities processing or storing proxy credentials are
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able to retrieve and deliberately misuse any stored proxy credential.
Vulnerability 6.4 Additional complexity, dependency and invocations The
indirect user proxy propagation involves service invocations with a strong
dependency of a Grid layer on the availability of the credential management
service and the scalability of the mechanism. Also the potentially necessary
renewal of proxy credentials introduces additional callbacks between Grid
services.
Although these concerns might be considered a lower-ranking or circumstan-
tial vulnerability, they impact not only availability and system performance
as such, but as well affect the potential for errors and flaws within the
infrastructure’s implementation, operation and administration.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, X.509 proxy certificates as a mechanism for delegation of
privileges have been analyzed and their shortcomings and limitations have
been specified.
Due to the conceptual limitations of unrestricted delegation, transparent
user delegation based on X.509 proxy certificates leads to no significant
improvement in comparison to a masquerade-based delegation approach.
While the presence of a respective X.509 proxy certificate might be assumed
to indicate or prove a Grid user’s request to execute a certain Grid job
or task within a Grid layer, there is no reasonable justification for such
an assumption. Within a Grid layer utilizing delegation by masquerade,
Grid job or task requests can potentially be altered or forged by at least
administrators and successful system attackers (see Section 5.3). This is
equally the case in a transparent user delegation scenario based on X.509
proxy certificates. Worse, the universality of an X.509 proxy certificate and
its independent validity can potentially simplify and disguise an abuse
or even enable an additional range of exploitation, in comparison to the
possible misuse or alteration of a Grid job or task request within a delegation
by masquerade. Finally, the utilization of X.509 proxy certificates implicates
a raised scalability and availability dependency due to additional service
invocations and callbacks.
68 Chapter 6. Analysis of Delegation and X.509 Proxy Certificates
X.509 proxy certificates based on unrestricted delegation are unprotected
credentials, passed on and thereby exposed within a Grid layer. In con-
sideration of the defined security objectives (see Section 4.5), X.509 proxy
certificates represent insufficient assurance concerning authentication and
authorization of any requests and are insignificant in matters of the authen-
ticity and non-repudiation of Grid job submissions.
”Let every eye negotiate for itself
and trust no agent.”
William Shakespeare
7
A Framework for Transparent
Dynamic Delegation
In response to the deficiencies and vulnerabilites identified for both del-
egation by masquerade and delegation based on X.509 proxy certificates
(see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6), a new framework for delegation in e-Science
Grids will be presented in this Chapter.
After a discussion of related work, object entities within an e-Science
Grid will be analyzed and distinguished. Based on these entities and the
concept of signed textual statements, a new delegation framework, named
mediated definite delegation, will be presented. The framework affords a trans-
parent dynamic delegation of tasks via intermediary brokers and enables
verifiable authenticity and non-repudiation of the authorship of Grid files
as well as of submission and processing of Grid jobs.
Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been presented in [PUB5,
PUB10].
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7.1 Related Work
Beyond the analysis of delegation by masquerade and delegation based
on X.509 proxy certificates in the previous chapter, this section presents a
discussion of further related work.
Aside from the defined security objectives (see Section 4.5), an auxiliary
concern and boundary condition is the least invasive integration of secu-
rity mechanisms into the defined e-Science Grid architecture (see Section
3.3). The utilization of remote callbacks or additional service invocations
will induce additional complexity and risks of reduced availability due to
potential failures or attacks, and will amount to additional dependencies
and load in matters of scalability and delays.
In [44], a security framework for on-demand restricted delegation is pre-
sented as an approach in order to allow least-privileged delegation in Grid
infrastructures. The mechanism is based on a delegation ontology, allowing
to express the terms of delegations in a structured and formalized manner.
Hence, it is for instance possible to specify Subjects as authorized delegatees
or to explicitly express delegated Capabilities consisting of Verbs and Objects
as authorized actions with respect to a delegation. Upon delegation of a
task by a Grid user, the framework requires the user’s client to provide a
delegation service with a delegation policy for the respective task. Once
services want to perform the task as a delegatee in the name of the user they
are required to request a signed delegation credential from the delegation
service, which validates the request based on the provided policy informa-
tion. Despite the rich functionality and potential to provide context- and
delegatee-sensitive least-privileged delegation, two fundamental drawbacks
of the framework can be identified: first, the necessary translation of every
delegation into a delegation policy, and second, the additional service invo-
cations concerning the delegation service upon the publishing of a policy
and the request of a delegation credential.
Within the UNICORE Grid middleware, a delegation framework called
explicit trust delegation (ETD) [124] offers static delegation by digitally signing
task requests using public-key signatures. ETD uses one signature, either
by the Grid user or a trusted Grid portal, which in the latter case is conse-
quently based on unrestricted delegation to the portal. Being based on a
static delegation, ETD supports no intermediate processing of a task request.
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In version 6 of the UNICORE framework, the delegation framework was
revised, resulting in a new framework called dynamic ETD [52]. The new
framework utilizes chains of signed assertions as operation requests based
on public-key signatures and thereby provides for non-repudiation of the
endorsement of an assertion. Yet, due to the necessary signature and verifi-
cation on the level of single operation requests, the authors identify a drastic
impact on performance. Moreover, the framework does not consider the
authenticity and authorship of Grid files referred to within the assertions.
In [46, 45], a security framework for the Condor distributed batch com-
puting system is presented, based on signed task descriptions, so called
Signed ClassAds. A Signed ClassAd is placed inside an X.509 proxy certificate
as a policy information, together with so called action authorization expres-
sions. These are rules expressing which entity is allowed to use the proxy
credential for which purpose. The mechanism enables e.g. to specify file
checksums as conditions for executables and input files of a task. However,
there is no explanation how to establish a dynamically assigned delegation
or allow transformations of a Signed ClassAd. The framework’s design
seems to presume all conditions to be expressed explicitly upon the initial
submission.
7.2 Object Entities of an e-Science Grid
Considering the classification of object entities within in a Grid layer, two
fundamental classes of object entities can be distinguished with respect to
their state and behavior while being processed within the system. These
two classes are specified and defined as follows: any data set or program
code within the Grid layer represents a passive entity at rest. Thereby any
alteration of the content of these entities will change their identity, which
implies any change of an existing object to result in a new object. This
characterization conforms with the definition of data checksums.
Definition 7.1 Data objects like data and program code files and soft-
ware packages are defined as passive stationary entities.
Grid Jobs represent active entities utilizing passive stationary entities, as
non-trivial jobs are based on data and program code provided within the
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Grid layer and Grid job results are stored in new data entries. Moreover,
Grid jobs are transient as their benefit or utility is established only by their
successful termination and the generation of corresponding results as data
entries. Also Grid transfers represent such transient active entities as re-
quests delegated to an agent to relocate or replicate physical copies of Grid
file entries as passive stationary entities.
Definition 7.2 Processes or tasks like Grid jobs or Grid transfers oper-
ating on stationary entities are defined as active transient entities.
Further on, delegation within a Grid layer applies only to active transient
entities directly while passive stationary entities are only affected as objects,
as either being read, executed, modified or created. Whereas in essence
a Grid user’s interactions with a Grid layer can be characterized as the
creation, modification and readout of passive stationary entities and the
creation and delegation of active transient entities.
7.3 Framework of Mediated Definite Delegation
Within this section, a delegation framework named mediated definite delega-
tion will be presented, providing transparent (see Section 6.1), dynamic and
least-privileged delegation of active transient entities and assured author-
ship of passive stationary entities. The framework specifies the necessary
steps and statements as a theoretical concept based on public-key signa-
tures. With respect to the signature mechanism there are no additional
assumptions, except to require each signor to secure its private key and
the respective public key as a certificate to be available for verification of
signatures wherever necessary within an infrastructure.
The defined e-Science Grid scenario (see Section 2.3) and architecture (see
Section 3.3) is based on a three-tier architecture (see Section 4.2) of Grid users
as service consumers, hereafter referred to as delegators, a central broker with
processing services within a Virtual Organization (VO), hereafter referred
to as broker, and Sites as resource providers with Worker Nodes (WNs),
herein represented as agents. Further, Grid jobs or transfer requests as
active transient entities are assumed to be represented as explicit textual
specifications, which are modified within the different stages of processing
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and execution.
The framework of mediated definite delegation is based on the delega-
tion of active transient entities by warrant, rather than employing auxiliary
mechanisms, such as additional credentials or externally provided policies
(see Section 4.1). In a nutshell, the outline of the framework is as follows:
a delegator specifies an activity in a delegation request and sends it to a
broker. The request is authenticated and authorized by the broker and
consecutively processed. The processing may apply transformations to the
request, while these transformations are required to be verifiable later on
based on a predefined rule set. The broker subsequently selects an agent
for execution and sends the transformed request to the agent. Thereby
an implicit authorization of the request occurs, viz. the broker attests its
approval by sending the request. The agent authenticates and authorizes
the request and subsequently executes it. Any access to passive stationary
entities during the execution of the request is assumed to be authenticated
and authorized based on the delegation request as both a credential and
a reference. Moreover, the agent issues a statement of authorship for any
created passive stationary entity.
In the following paragraphs, the framework will be specified, beginning
with the authorship of passive stationary entities, followed by a trivial intro-
ductionary case of a static delegation of active transient entities by warrant.
Subsequently, the mediated definite delegation will be specified for one
central broker as referred to above. Finally, the framework will be extended
to a potential scenario of collaborating VOs with multiple brokers between
delegators and agents.
Authorship. Within the framework, a statement of authorship is gen-
erally required for any creation of a passive stationary entity, e.g. file entries
in the Grid File Catalog, and must be signed by a respective creator. With
respect to passive stationary entities a declaration of authorship is defined
as follows:
Definition 7.3 A declaration of authorship is defined as a creator-signed tex-
tual statement specifying the identity of the creator of the referred passive
stationary entity as well as the name and identity of the passive stationary
entity and the time of creation.
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Every such statement then certifies the authorship of a specified passive
stationary entity by a creator at a certain point in time. Figure 7.1 shows
a Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram of such a statement and its
reference to a passive stationary entity.
Figure 7.1: UML diagram of the declaration of authorship.
Requiring a digital signature of the statement by the creator, such a
signed statement can prove the creator’s certification of authorship later
on as well as any potential changes of the entity. Within the limitations
of a utilized digital signature mechanism the creator is thereby unable to
repudiate the authorship.
Static delegation. Concerning the delegation of active transient enti-
ties, first, a trivial static delegation is defined and specified as a reference
point and introductionary case:
Definition 7.4 A static delegation by warrant is defined as a delegator-
signed textual statement specifying the delegator’s identity, the delegated
active transient entity as the job or task to be executed, the identity of the
agent assigned for the execution, the time of creation and the time of expira-
tion.
Every such statement then describes the delegation of a specified active
transient entity by a delegator to an agent with a specified period of validity
for its execution. Figure 7.2 shows a UML diagram of such a statement
representing an active transient entity which itself may refer to passive
stationary entities.
Requiring a digital signature of the statement by the delegator as the
issuer, an agent receiving such a signed statement can prove its mandate
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Figure 7.2: UML diagram of a static delegation.
later on and is able to use the signed statement as a credential. Within the
limitations of a utilized digital signature mechanism the delegator is thereby
unable to repudiate the submission and delegation of the specified task or
active transient entity to the agent.
Dynamic delegation. In order to enable a dynamic delegation, allow-
ing an intermediate broker to apply transformations to a delegator’s initially
submitted task or active transient entity and subsequently select an agent
for its execution, a mediated definite delegation is defined in a two-step scheme
as follows:
Definition 7.5 An un-mediated delegation is defined as a delegator-signed
textual statement specifying the delegator’s identity, the delegated active
transient entity as the task to be executed, the identity of the broker that is
assigned for the task’s processing and later selection of an agent for execu-
tion, the time of creation and the time of expiration.
Every such statement then describes the delegation of a specified active
transient entity by a delegator to a broker with a specified period of validity
for its processing and later execution. Figure 7.3 shows a UML diagram of
such a statement representing an active transient entity which itself may
refer to passive stationary entities.
Requiring a digital signature of the statement by the delegator as the
issuer of the statement, a broker receiving such a signed statement can prove
its mandate later on and is able to use the signed statement as a credential
for assigning the specified task to an agent. Within the limitations of a uti-
lized digital signature mechanism the delegator is then unable to repudiate
the submission and delegation of the specified active transient entity to the
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Figure 7.3: UML diagram the un-mediated delegation.
broker.
Definition 7.6 A mediation of delegation is defined as a broker-signed textual
statement specifying the mediating broker’s identity, the signed statement
of the respective un-mediated delegation, the changes or transformations
applied by the broker with respect to the initial task specification, the iden-
tity of the agent selected and assigned by the broker for execution, the time
of creation and the time of expiration.
Every such statement then describes the mediation of a specified un-
mediated delegation and the respective active transient entity by a broker
to an agent with a certain period of validity for its execution. Figure 7.4
shows a UML diagram of such a statement which contains the un-mediated
delegation it is descended from. The statement then represents an active
transient entity which was changed by the transformations specified within
the mediation of delegation.
Requiring a digital signature of the statement by the broker as the issuer
and mediator, an agent receiving such a signed statement can prove its
mandate later on and is able to use the signed statement as a credential
during execution. Within the limitations of a utilized digital signature
mechanism the broker is thereby unable to repudiate the mediation of the
specified task or active transient entity to the agent. Equally, the delegator’s
non-repudiable initial submission and delegation of the specified active
transient entity to the broker can be made transparently visible and verifiable
for an agent, due to the cascaded signatures.
A dynamic transparent delegation within an e-Science Grid with one bro-
ker between users as delegators and agents can now be established utilizing
the statements of authorship, un-mediated delegation and mediation of delegation.
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Figure 7.4: UML diagram of the mediation of delegation.
Multiple brokers. This delegation framework can be further extended to
a scenario with multiple brokers, enabling transitive relationships between
users as delegators and agents via more than one broker and their respective
domains or VOs, as follows: due to the transitive relationship, a creator’s
identity might be unknown to a domain a passive stationary entity is used
in. Therefore a witness of the authorship of a passive stationary entity is
defined.
Definition 7.7 A declaration of witness of authorship is defined as a broker-
signed textual statement, specifying the identity of the witnessing broker,
the witnessed declaration of authorship, which can be a declaration of wit-
ness of authorship itself, and the time of creation.
Every such statement then certifies the witness of a specified declaration
of authorship by a broker at a certain point in time. Due to the declaration
of witness, passive stationary entities can be utilized beyond the borders of
domains or VOs, with intermediate brokers vouching for their utilization.
Figure 7.5 shows a UML diagram of such a statement which contains the
declaration of authorship it is descended from. The declaration of witness
of authorship is further declared to be a subclass of the declaration of
authorship. Therefore, it is possible to concatenate declarations of witness
of authorship via more than one broker.
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Figure 7.5: UML diagram of the declaration of witness of authorship.
Requiring a digital signature of the statement by the broker, such a signed
statement can prove the broker’s certification of a witness of authorship
later on as well as any potential changes to the passive stationary entity
concerned. Within the limitations of a utilized digital signature mechanism
the broker is thereby unable to repudiate the witnessing.
In order to further allow for the transitive relationship of users as dele-
gators and agents via more than one broker, a propagation of un-mediated
delegation between brokers is defined:
Definition 7.8 An un-mediated propagation is defined as a broker-signed
textual statement, specifying the propagating broker’s identity, a signed
statement of an un-mediated delegation, the changes or transformations
applied by the broker with respect to the foregoing task specification, a
second broker’s identity to which the statement is propagated to, and the
time of creation as well as the time of expiration. The signed statement of an
un-mediated delegation can thereby be an un-mediated propagation itself.
Every such statement then describes the propagation of a specified un-
mediated delegation and the respective active transient entity by a broker
to another broker with a specified period of validity for its processing.
Figure 7.6 shows a UML diagram of such a statement which contains the un-
mediated delegation it is descended from. The un-mediated propagation is
further declared to be a subclass of the un-mediated delegation. Hence, it is
possible to allow more than one propagation or respectively a concatenation
of propagations via brokers up to a final mediation of delegation.
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Figure 7.6: UML diagram of the un-mediated propagation.
Requiring a digital signature of the statement by the broker as the issuer
and propagator, a second broker receiving such a signed statement can
prove its mandate later on and is able to use the signed statement as a
credential during mediation or further propagation. Within the limitations
of a utilized digital signature mechanism the first broker is thereby unable to
repudiate the propagation of the active transient entity to the second broker.
Equally, the delegator’s non-repudiable initial submission and delegation of
the specified active transient entity to the broker and potential consecutive
propagations by brokers can be made transparently visible and verifiable to
an agent.
Figure 7.7: The framework of mediated definite delegation with two bro-
kers.
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Figure 7.7 illustrates the concept of the framework of mediated definite
delegation as a whole with the defined signed statements passed on in
interaction requests. The submission, processing and assignment of an
active transient entity by a user is demonstrated by the request ’udeleg’ as
an un-mediated delegation to a queue of active transient entities, such as a
Grid Task Queue, at the first broker. The first broker initiates a propagation
of un-mediated delegation as the ’prob’ request to the second broker. The
second broker finally arranges the mediation of delegation by the ’med’
request to the agent, where the active transient entity can be executed, e.g.
as a Grid job on a Worker Node (WN).
The declaration of authorship of a passive stationary entity, e.g. a file
entry, by a user is shown as an ’auth’ request to the first broker managing a
catalog of passive stationary entities, such as a Grid File Catalog. The decla-
ration of authorship for an active transient entity result, e.g. as an output file,
is represented by the agent’s ’auth’ request to the second broker. The second
broker then creates a declaration of witness of authorship represented by
the ’witn’ request to the first broker.
The figure shows an active transient entity queue and a passive station-
ary entity catalog within the first broker. With according adjustments of the
respective ’witn’ and ’prob’ requests, one or both of them can be alternatively
located at any other or further brokers.
7.4 Summary
A new framework for delegation in e-Science Grids named mediated definite
delegation has been presented in this Chapter. The framework allows to
transparently delegate active transient entities, viz. tasks or Grid jobs, via
one or more brokers to an agent for execution. Any intermediary broker
can perform transformations of the initial specification of an active transient
entity and dynamically select either another broker for further propagation
of the request or an agent for execution. Based only on signed statements
which are sent out by a statement’s signer, viz. a user or broker, a receiver of
such a statement, viz. a broker or agent, is able to verify the digital signature
and all relevant information provided within the statement. Hence, the
authenticity of requests and according authorizations can be immediately
verified and non-repudiation of the requested actions is provided.
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For passive stationary entities, such as Grid files or software packages,
the framework requires a creator-signed declaration of authorship affording
non-repudiation of the creation and verifiable authenticity of a passive sta-
tionary entity. Once passive stationary entities are utilized within domains
of no direct relation to the entities’ creators, declarations of witness of au-
thorship that are signed by witnessing intermediaries can be used. Hence,
transitive assurance via several intermediary witnesses of the authorship
can be arranged.
Due to the presented framework, the receiver (agent) of a statement
of mediated delegation can be forced to use the signed statement as a
credential to access passive stationary entities during the execution of the
respective active transient entity, for instance with respect to file or data
access. Thereby, any authorization is bound and limited according to the
specifications of the statement and an agent is consequently not authorized
to execute arbitrary program code or make arbitrary file or data changes.
Accordingly, the statement as a credential affords protection against misuse
of the delegating user’s identity as well as against unnoticed alteration of
the requested actions. Yet, this requires the specifications of a statement
being sufficiently detailed and nonambiguous to facilitate an according
least-privileged delegation.
The framework and its mechanisms completely integrate into the e-
Science Grid architecture defined in Chapter 3 and require no remote call-
backs or additional invocations.
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”Love all, trust a few, do wrong to none.”
William Shakespeare
8
A Security Architecture for
e-Science Grids
In this chapter a new security architecture for e-Science Grids established on
the framework of mediated definite delegation (see Chapter 7) will be presented
and specified in detail.
The delegation framework as a concept will be applied to the defined
e-Science Grid architecture (see Section 3.3). The resulting security architec-
ture for e-Science Grids will extend mechanisms implemented within the
ALICE Grid Services (see Section 3.1) and include solutions to the identified
vulnerabilities (see Chapter 5). Beyond the framework of mediated definite
delegation, the security architecture for e-Science Grids will thereby provide
the fulfillment of the defined security objectives (see Section 4.5).
The chapter is organized in three main sections concerning Grid data
layer security, Grid job layer security and secured communication and will
conclude in a discussion of the results and achievement of the presented
security architecture.
Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been presented in [PUB4,
PUB5, PUB7, PUB9, PUB10].
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8.1 Grid Data Layer Security
Within the following sections, the framework of mediated definite delegation
(see Section 7.3) will be applied to the defined e-Science Grid architecture’s
data layer (see Section 3.3). The presented mechanisms refer to the Grid File
Catalog and the SE access protocol of the ALICE Grid Services (see Section
3.1.3) and include solutions to the identified vulnerabilities (see Section
5.2). Further, multiple cascaded Grid File Catalogs will be discussed as an
extension.
First, a mechanism for Grid file system consistency in reply to the identi-
fied vulnerabilities in the ALICE Grid Services will be presented. Thereafter,
an implementation of the authorship statement for passive stationary enti-
ties within the framework of mediated definite delegation will be specified,
which introduces certified Grid files. Subsequently, a mechanism for on-
demand storage discovery will be presented, affording improvements with
respect to storage quality-of-service and availability. Further, an implemen-
tation of Grid file transfers will be briefly specified.
8.1.1 Grid File System Consistency
Due to the separation of a Grid file system into independent layers of logical
and physical data based on a Grid File Catalog and SEs (see Section 3.3), a
two- or three-phased protocol for data access is required: for read access, a
client or service retrieves logical information and authorization on the level
of Central Grid Services based on the Grid File Catalog and consecutively
connects to an SE and reads the data. In case of a write access, the client or
service requests authorization on the central level, consecutively connects
to an SE and writes the file entry, and finally registers a new file entry or
respective modifications on the central level in the Grid File Catalog.
Within this schema, race conditions or collisions concerning logical Grid
file entries can occur during write operations, which was identified before
as a vulnerability within the ALICE Grid Services (see Section 5.2). A similar
functional issue affects the deletion of logical and physical file entries and
the potential reuse of previously existing Logical File Names (LFNs) in the
Grid File Catalog.
Booking Table An LFN entry can refer to multiple Physical File Names
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(PFNs) as replicas of the same physical data (see Section 3.3). Once a client
requests access to a new file entry (LFN) in the Grid File Catalog, the LFN
will be in a pending or transient state conceptually until the client uploaded
the physical file and triggers its registration. The same applies to the respec-
tive PFN entry, as a replica of the LFN. In order to keep track of write or
delete operations in a Grid file system, a database table, named Booking Table,
is introduced. Whenever a PFN entry enters or leaves the Grid File Catalog,
entries in this table present the PFN in its transient state until the final com-
pletion of the operation. The state of an LFN is implicitly represented by its
PFN entries, once it is not existing in the Grid File Catalog.
Figure 8.1 shows the state modeling of LFN entries and their transitions,
which is explained as follows: Upon an authorized write request from a
service or client, a corresponding entry is added to the Booking Table for
each PFN, containing the PFN, LFN and owner of the prospective Grid File
Catalog entry. This alters the LFN entry’s state from untaken to booked in
case it is unknown to the system, or from freed to booked in case it was used
before or deleted (see below). Upon registration as the finalization of a write
operation, an entry is removed from the Booking Table and registered in
the Grid File Catalog. This alters the LFN entry’s state from booked to visible
once one PFN entry is registered.
In case a user removes a file entry or a PFN entry as one replica of an
LFN entry in the Grid File Catalog, the physical removal is independent of
the Grid File Catalog. Again, an entry for each concerned PFN is added to
the Booking Table, and the LFN is removed from the Grid File Catalog, once
the last PFN was removed. The latter is represented by the state transition
from visible to freed.
The Booking Table further has a lifetime value for each entry whereby
a time out for unregistered write access requests can be provided, which
describes the distinction of the LFN states booked and freed. Potentially
existing unregistered data entries on SEs can then be removed based on
the Booking Table entries, represented in the LFN state transition freed to
untaken. Alternatively, in case a freed LFN is requested by a user (again), the
LFN will be set to state booked.
By introducing the Booking Table, LFNs and PFNs can be represented in
all their respective states, file operations altering the Grid File Catalog can
be assured to be atomic and their access control can be consistently enforced.
86 Chapter 8. A Security Architecture for e-Science Grids
Figure 8.1: The states and transitions of an LFN entry in the Booking Table.
8.1.2 Certified Grid Files
Once a file operation is authorized on the level of Central Grid Services
and the Grid File Catalog, a client has to be enabled to access an SE and
perform the physical file operation. In order to avoid additional callbacks or
invocations in terms of authentication and authorization an Access Ticket is
defined, initially based on the concept of an Access Envelope [74] as utilized
within the ALICE Grid Services (see Section 5.2).
Access Ticket An Access Ticket grants direct access to a specified file entry
on an SE, according to its internal authorization information. It specifies the
PFN as the location of the physical file entry, the granted access permission
and timestamps of creation and expiration. Based on a public-key signature
mechanism, the ticket is signed after authorization by a Central Grid Ser-
vice, using the private key corresponding to an X.509 certificate of the VO’s
Central Grid Services. Once sent to a client upon request, the signed Access
Ticket will allow a client to authenticate and authorize an according access
at an SE.
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Status Ticket Due to the decoupling of logical and physical data, Central
Grid Services rely on client-provided information concerning identity and
size of a file. In order to provide for a confirmation of this information by
an SE, a second SE-signed ticket is utilized. Thereby each SE uses its own
private key, with the corresponding public key being available to Central
Grid Services, e.g. based on an X.509 certificate. Within this Status Ticket,
the SE states the PFN of a file entry and the verified checksum and size
of the according file data, together with the timestamp of creation of the
ticket. After a successful write operation of a file entry on an SE by a client,
the client requests the signed Status Ticket from the SE and sends it to the
Central Grid Services for registration of the file entry in the Grid File Catalog.
Thereby the Status Ticket assures the existence, size, and checksum of the
respective file entry.
File Certificate The usage of Booking Table, Access Ticket and Status
Ticket in combination can assure that a Grid File Catalog contains only
consistent and authentic data with respect to the physical storage level of
SEs. In order to further allow for undeniable authorship of Grid file en-
tries, the final registration of a new or changed file entry in the Grid File
Catalog additionally requires a signed request to be sent by the Grid Client
Interface to Central Grid Services, named File Certificate. A File Certificate
contains a respective file entry’s LFN, the data checksum, the username and
a timestamp of creation, and is signed by Grid users using the private key
corresponding to their X.509 Grid certificates.
Write Figure 8.2 shows the final access protocol based on Access and
Status Ticket and a File Certificate in case of a write operation on a Grid
file, which is further explained as follows: initially, the Grid Client Interface
requests an Access Ticket from Central Grid Services. After successful au-
thentication and authorization of the request, an according entry is added to
the Booking Table. A signed Access Ticket is sent by Central Grid Services to
the Grid Client Interface. The Grid Client Interface uses the Access Ticket to
request write access at the SE, which grants the access based on the Access
Tickets signed information. In case a physical file entry already exists, the
SE consults the time of creation of both the physical file entry and the Access
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Ticket. The access will then only be authorized in case the existing file entry
was created before the Access Ticket. Thus, malicious replays of Access
Tickets can be prevented.
Upon a successful write operation, the Grid Client Interface requests
the Status Ticket from the SE, which calculates size and checksum of the
file and creates and replies a signed Status Ticket. The Grid Client Interface
assures the file operation was successful using the Status Ticket and creates
a signed File Certificate, which is then sent together with the signed Status
Ticket to the Central Grid Services for registration. If the verification of the
Status Ticket and the File Certificate are successful, the corresponding entry
in the Booking Table is deleted and the file entry is registered in the Grid
File Catalog together with the File Certificate.
Delete The deletion of file entries is analogues to a write operation,
Figure 8.2: The certified Grid file write access based on a File Certificate.
while the SE sends a Status Ticket stating the physical deletion to the Grid
Client Interface. The Grid Client Interface then sends the Status Ticket to the
Central Grid Services, where the PFN is finally marked as deleted within
the Booking Table (see Section 8.1.1).
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Read Concerning read accesses of file entries, a Grid Client Interface
requests an according Access Ticket from the Central Grid Services. In case
of successful authentication and authorization of a request the Grid Client
Interface uses the replied Access Ticket to request the physical file data from
an SE.
Copying, moving and alteration Whenever a file entry is (physically)
copied including a new LFN entry in the Grid File Catalog, viz. the file
is neither replicated as a new physical copy of the same logical file, nor
logically linked to an LFN, the according request and creation procedure is
analogous to the creation of a new file. Consequently, the File Certificate of
the new file entry will be signed by and represent the identity of the copying
user. Analogously this applies to file entries that are logically moved within
the file system hierarchy of the Grid File Catalog or to file entries whose
data was physically altered or modified. There, the File Certificate will be
signed by and represent the identity of the modifying user.
File Certificate storage The File Certificates are stored within the Grid File
Catalog as an additional attribute of the respective LFN entry. Furthermore,
the X.509 user certificates are presumed to be stored in a database or storage
within the Central Grid Services.
Uncontrolled data locations The registration of uncontrolled or exter-
nal data locations as PFNs in the Grid File Catalog, as e.g. data accessible
via HTTP, is an additional concern, as it is neither possible to assure file data
integrity with respect to a respective PFN entry, nor to identify its prove-
nance. Any LFN registration of data entries not accessible via the previously
defined access protocol based on trusted SEs does therefore require an ad-
ditional verification: a registration of an uncontrolled data resource will
require a Grid user-signed File Certificate stating the respective LFN and
PFN, the data checksum, the username and a timestamp. Upon request an
according entry is placed into the Booking Table, while a central verification
service retrieves the file data from the resource specified by the PFN. The
data checksum is verified using the provided File Certificate, and in case
of successful verification the entry is removed from the Booking Table and
added to the Grid File Catalog. In this case, the Grid user vouches for the
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registered external data resource and data integrity can be verified later on.
Cascaded Grid File Catalogs Concerning cascaded Grid File Catalogs
(see Section 3.3), wherein file entries in global Grid File Catalogs refer to
local Grid File Catalogs in terms of physical locations of file data, the usage
of SE-based local Grid File Catalogs is assumed to be consistent with the pre-
viously presented scenario. Concerning global file entries, File Certificates
must be equally provided by registration, in order to assure authenticity and
authorship within the global Grid file system layer. This case is assumed
to be either analogous to the registration of external data locations, with a
central verification service retrieving and verifying the entry, or size and
checksum information of the data being fetched directly from the according
local Grid File Catalog, in case a respective trust relationship allows that.
In conclusion the propagation of a File Certificate represents a declara-
tion of authorship (see Definition 7.3) within the framework of mediated
definite delegation (see Section 7.3) with the respective File Certificate as the
creator-signed statement. With the Status Ticket, digitally signed by an SE, a
witness of authorship is further implemented similar to the declaration of
witness of authorship (see Definition 7.7).
8.1.3 On-demand Storage Discovery
In order to enable transparent utilizations of physical file replicas, failover
functionality and improved performance, a dynamic on-demand SE discov-
ery mechanism is integrated into the SE access protocol.
Ranking By introducing SE status and ranking tables within central Grid
services combined with scheduled availability and performance checkups,
it is possible to select SEs for clients’ data read and write requests based
on multiple criteria: a main central status table contains information on
availability, and bandwidth and usage statistics of all known SEs. This infor-
mation is interlaced with network topology and performance statistics, such
as geographic and routing proximity and round-trip times, in between all
Sites within the Grid layer via the MonALISA framework [25, 3]. The results
are stored relative to every Site within an SE ranking table, representing
a preference list of all functional SEs for every Site. Further, SEs can be
labelled with storage identifiers, such as disk or tape storage type, as well
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as access restrictions via their registration record in the Grid Layer’s central
LDAP directory.
Discovery Upon read or write requests by clients, whether Grid users
or job clients, the respective client IP address is mapped to a Site based on
network topology. During the processing of the request, prior to the creation
of an Access Ticket, an SE is selected based on the SE ranking table, using
the mapped Site as the key attribute. According to the type of request, the
best SE entries are selected for the consecutive creation of Access Tickets.
Thereby, access restrictions for SEs and possibly also additional parameters
specified by the client or centrally predefined rule sets are taken into account.
Parameters specified by a client within a request can be explicitly favored
or excluded SEs, SEs that failed during previous requests as well as storage
types of SEs according to the predefined labels. In case of a write request by
a client, a number of intended replicas of a file can be specified. Centrally
predefined rule sets can concern e.g. load-balancing or data distribution as
further emphasized below.
In case of a read request of a client for Grid file entry, with several repli-
cas of the physical file on different SEs, the mechanism is accordingly able to
dynamically select the best available SE with respect to the client. In case of
a write request for a new file entry, the mechanism chooses the best available
SEs and consecutively issues and replies all respective Access Tickets within
one request. In case of failing file operations on SEs, a client simply requests
again Access Tickets for SEs, specifying the respective SEs’ identifiers as
pre-failing SEs within its consecutive request for Access Tickets. Thereby,
the Booking Table (see Section 8.1.1) assures consecutive write requests for
the same logical file are consistently handled with respect to the File Catalog.
Hence, once a request to an SE fails, the mechanism enables a failover to
another SE whenever possible, and thereby avoids potentially failing client
operations due to unreachable data or impossible data saving.
Data distribution Further on, an automatic data distribution can be
achieved, leading to improved data availability as both data access per-
formance and prevention of data loss: the presented mechanisms allow to
automatically store Grid job results close to the WN, at which a respective
job is executed by the selection of network-topology-wise close SEs. Hence,
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with an according Grid job management it is possible to arrange the results
of Grid jobs to be stored in proximity of the respective Grid jobs’ input files.
This approach can then be capitalized in case of subject- or content-wise-
clustered data files or a multistage processing of data. At the same time, the
mechanism allows to implement further constraints for data distribution
via predefined rule sets respected during the selection of SEs. Examples of
such constraints are storage types, e.g. a tape storage, or regional distance
with respect to the client, such as storage on another continent, geographic
region or country.
8.1.4 Grid File Transfers
Grid file transfers are classified as active transient entities (see Section 7.2)
and could be implemented analogous to the framework’s implementation
of Grid jobs specified below in Section 8.2. The functionality of Grid file
transfers (see Section 3.3) in combination with the SE access protocol spec-
ified above allows though for a conceptual simplification, since Grid file
transfers only replicate or move physical data of existing file entries in the
Grid File Catalog from one SE to another.
Due to the presented mechanism of certified Grid files, a file entry’s
authorship and the authenticity of respective physical file data are verifiable,
impeding covert alteration of logical file entries and physical file data as
well as forgery of logical file entries. Hence, an implementation of Grid file
transfers is only required to include the verification of the SE-signed Status
Ticket, as specified above. In this case, a Grid file transfer delegated to any
agent as a replication or moving of physical file data is strictly limited and
controlled, including the event of an unsuccessful operation.
8.1.5 Implementation in AliEn
In AliEn version 2.19, the Booking Table and a first stage of the certified file
operations as well as the on-demand storage discovery were implemented
and deployed to the ALICE Grid Services in production [PUB4, PUB1]. The
Access and the Status Ticket where fully implemented, while the implemen-
tation did not include the File Certificates. The Status Ticket registration was
not enforced, and the mechanisms were applied in order to merely assure
consistency of the logical information in the Grid File Catalog and physical
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file entries on SEs.
8.2 Grid Job Layer Security
Within the following sections, the framework of mediated definite delegation
(see Section 7.3) will be applied to the defined e-Science Grid architecture’s
job layer (see Section 3.3). The presented mechanisms include solutions to
the vulnerabilities identified within the ALICE Grid Services (see Section
5.3).
First, an implementation of the dynamic delegation of active transient
entities within the framework of mediated definite delegation will be speci-
fied, leading to the concept of certified Grid jobs. This will be followed by a
brief consideration of Grid applications security. Finally, two approaches
for Grid job execution protection will be presented and outlined.
8.2.1 Certified Grid Jobs
Analogous to the concept of the File Certificates presented beforehand, Grid
Client Interface can digitally sign a JDL upon submission of a Grid job
request. By demanding a user-signed JDL (hereafter referred to as an sJDL)
for the submission of a Grid job, it is possible to prove the integrity of a Grid
job and to identify illegal modifications with respect to the user’s submis-
sion at any point in time later on. Using timestamps within the sJDL, set
by the Grid Client Interface and verified by a VO’s Central Grid Services
upon submission, an sJDL represents a delegation by warrant, stating a user
requested a certain Grid job to be executed within the specified time frame.
Job transformations According to the defined e-Science Grid architec-
ture (see Section 3.3), a Grid job submission and respectively its JDL can
be transformed during its processing within Central Grid Services. Such
transformations are applied to an sJDL by appending changed or additional
statements, which will overrule the initial specifications of the sJDL of the
submitter. In order to allow for later verification of such transformations’
correctness, all transformations must comply with a predefined rule set. An
example of a transformation is the splitting of a job into sub jobs according
to the distribution of input data: the original sJDL is thereby copied for
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every sub job, and a determined input data specification is appended to
each sub job’s sJDL, which overrules existing input data specifications of
the original part of the sJDL.
Job Certificate Before a Grid Job is sent to a Site for execution, a VO’s Cen-
tral Grid Services (as a broker) digitally sign a processed and transformed
sJDL, using the private key corresponding to an X.509 certificate of the VO’s
Central Grid Services. This double-signed JDL will be hereinafter referred
to as a Job Certificate.
Once arriving on a Worker Node (WN), an authenticated Grid Job Agent
(GJA) gets authorized as a delegatee of a Grid job, which the GJA is re-
quested to execute according to statements defined within the Job Certificate.
Job submission A protocol for certified Grid Jobs based on Job Certificates
is illustrated in Figure 8.3 and presented as follows: upon submission of a
Grid job, the Grid Client Interface sets a submission and an expiration times-
tamp in the JDL and signs it using the Grid user’s private key, corresponding
to its X.509 certificate. This sJDL is sent to the Central Grid Services as a
Grid job submission. If the Grid user’s X.509 certificate is not in the VO’s
disposal already, the X.509 certificate is appended to the submission request.
The signature of the sJDL and the submission and expiration timestamps
are validated within the Central Grid Services, the sJDL is placed into the
Grid Task Queue and subsequently processed.
Job execution As a result of a previous request from Central Grid Services,
a Site’s Grid Site Service submits a Grid Job Agent (GJA) request to the Site’s
resource management system. The GJA request includes the Central Grid
Services’ X.509 certificate and a credential in order to allow the later GJA to
connect to Central Grid Services. Upon startup, the GJA connects to Central
Grid Services, and authenticates itself using the credential and requests a
Grid job for execution.
Presuming a successful matchmaking between the Grid job request’s
requirements and the GJA’s capabilities, the processed (and thereby possibly
transformed) sJDL is prepared for submission to a Site: after appending
anew submission and expiration timestamps as well as an identifier of the
Site (or the WN) to the sJDL, the Central Grid Services digitally sign the
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Figure 8.3: The processing of a certified Grid job based on a Job Certificate.
processed sJDL using the private key corresponding to a VO-specific X.509
certificate, which thereby becomes a Job Certificate. While the Grid user’s
submission and expiration timestamps within the Job Certificate define the
time window the VO is entitled to send the Grid job request to Sites, the
VO’s timestamps can be adapted to the desired runtime window of a Grid
job on a WN, and as such can define a shorter time window. Once created,
the Job Certificate is sent together with the Grid user’s X.509 certificate to the
GJA. The GJA verifies the Job Certificate’s signatures, the two time frames
of validity and the X.509 certificates, and refuses to execute the Grid job
in case of a failure in any of these validation steps. During the Grid job’s
execution, the Job Certificate is then used by the GJA as a credential in order
to authenticate and authorize the access of Grid files, such as the job’s input
files. These authorizations occur based on the data specifications within the
Job Certificate.
Job output files Once a Grid job has finished or stopped, the GJA uploads
and registers the job’s output files in the name of the Grid job submitter,
using the Job Certificate as a credential. Thereby, job output specifications
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in the Job Certificate can assure a GJA will only be granted write access to
the specified files or directories. Due to the concept of certified Grid files,
also the file registration of output files requires the creation of signed File
Certificates (see Section 8.1.2). These signatures can be applied either via
a signature service controlled by the Site (see Section 8.4) or directly by
the GJA, while an according X.509 certificate and key must be provided.
Consequently, the certificate will belong to and represent a respective Site’s
or VO’s identity at a Site. In order to identify the file entry’s origin, the file
entry in the Grid File Catalog must be further linked to the Job Certificate
via meta data.
Job certificate logging In order to enable traceability and non-repudiation
of Grid job submissions, the Job Certificate of an executed Grid job must be
logged and kept by a Site. This will require a Site-provided facility to log a
Job Certificate upon Grid Job execution, which will be further discussed in
Section 8.2.3.
In conclusion, the presented mechanism using composite signatures of a
JDL represents the instantiation of the framework of mediated definite dele-
gation (see Section 7.3) with one broker between users and agents. Thereby,
the user-signed sJDL represents a request of un-mediated delegation (see
Definition 7.5), and the submission of a Job Certificate to a Site represents a
mediation of delegation (see Definition 7.6). Within the framework, transfor-
mations of an initially delegated active transient entity are specified within
the statement of mediation of delegation. This aspect is arranged slightly
different within Job Certificates, as the results of transformations are ap-
pended to an initially signed job specification (sJDL), rather than providing
the transformations as statements themselves.
8.2.2 Grid Application Security
During their storage as software packages, Grid applications represent
passive stationary entities (see Section 7.2), and accordingly their integrity
and authenticity is required to be protected (see Objective 4.2). In the
case of Grid applications are provided via Grid file entries in a Grid File
Catalog, verifiable integrity and authenticity is achieved by the presented
mechanism of certified Grid files. Otherwise, a mechanism analogue to the
File Certificate can be implemented, wherein a Grid application package’s
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data checksum together with a timestamp is digitally signed using a known
and acknowledged X.509 certificate upon deployment. The signature can
then be verified before the application’s use, e.g. by the GJA. Hence, a
package’s authenticity can be verified and alterations of Grid applications
referred to by Grid jobs can be identified before their execution.
8.2.3 Grid Job Execution Protection
A remaining issue is the Grid job execution protection on a WN as the pro-
tection of the GJA against access from Grid jobs and the mutual isolation
of Grid jobs (see Vulnerability 5.13). Such a protection cannot be afforded
by the presented mechanisms and requires additional functionality to be
emplaced, the utilization of according mechanisms is though foreseen and
arranged. Moreover, with respect to traceability and non-repudiation of
a job submission, a Job Certificate is required to be logged on Site-level,
which is assumed to be handled by an according Site-based mechanism. As
a reply to these concerns, two potential approaches are outlined within the
following paragraphs.
gLExec the middleware component gLExec [86] facilitates the protection of
a GJA and the isolation of Grid jobs on the level of an UNIX operating sys-
tem’s user account separation, similar to the UNIX sudo command. Instead
of a direct execution of a Grid job on a WN, gLExec is invoked by a GJA,
which performs a user and environment switch on a WN’s operating system,
and consecutively executes the Grid job as another system user. Moreover,
gLExec can be configured to authenticate and authorize a job request, ex-
pecting an X.509 proxy credential as an additional input parameter, e.g. the
proxy credential of the Grid job submitter (see Section 6.3). By appropriate
modifications within gLExec, this authentication and authorization can be
provided, based on a verification of Job Certificates. Moreover, a Site-level
logging of Job Certificates could be directly integrated. Such a modified
implementation of gLExec would then enable a Site to enforce access control
with respect to job executions, while requiring no longer to entrust this
control to the GJA service.
Virtualization Alternatively, Grid frameworks based on virtualization,
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like the CernVM Co-Pilot [59, 88, 87] and XGE [123, 122], facilitate manage-
ment and submission of virtual machine images to WNs and the execution
of Grid jobs within virtual machines. Thereby strong isolation of Grid jobs
and consequent protection of a GJA can be achieved. The combination of
the herein presented mechanisms and a Grid job execution based on vir-
tualization is therefore assumed to make further security improvements
possible. Whereupon, analogous to a solution based on gLExec, an imple-
mentation could include the Job Certificate as a credential for authentication
and authorization of a virtualized Grid job execution and a logging of the
Job Certificate.
8.3 Secured Communication
Mutually authenticated and protected communication of Grid services can
be established with standard mechanisms like the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) [70] protocol, while using X.509 certificates for authentication. Due to
the availability of X.509 certificates on part of Grid users and the required
X.509 certificate for Central Grid Services in terms of the creation of Job
Certificates, secured communication can be established for communications
between Grid Client Interfaces and Central Grid Services. Provided that
X.509 certificates are also available for Site-based services, these communi-
cations can be equally protected, including the data communication with
SEs. Concerning the LDAP directory service, a standard method [37] for
authenticated and protected communication is available, utilizing the TLS
protocol with X.509 certificates for authentication.
8.4 Discussion and Evaluation
The results and achievements of the presented security architecture estab-
lished on the framework of mediated definite delegation with respect to the
defined security objectives (see Section 4.5) are discussed as follows:
Certified Grid files Due to the presented mechanism for certified Grid
files, a Grid File Catalog can be fully based on authentic Grid file entries,
while the introduced Booking Table assures consistency and non-bypassable
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authorization. On the basis of Access Ticket, Status Ticket and File Certifi-
cate, it is possible to assure the authenticity of data on the logical level, while
preserving the original two- and three-phased protocol, viz. requiring no
additional callbacks or direct connections between the logical and physical
data level. File Certificates in combination with trusted data checksum
verifications force Grid users to acknowledge and attest the authorship of
introduced file data. Hence, the mechanism provides verifiable integrity,
authenticity and non-repudiable authorship of Grid files (see Objective 4.1).
Provenance of scientific data Scientific provenance frameworks [67, 80]
provide mechanisms in order to retrace all steps of processing that pro-
duced a certain data set, and thereby facilitate reproducible findings. The
presented security architecture can assure the origin of data concerning
their authorship, or their origin by means of a certain Grid job execution.
Consequently, it provides a universal basis for further analysis of scientific
data provenance on the level of Grid files, independently of an area of re-
search and its computational methods. A limitation concerns the copying,
modification, deletion or moving of file entries and data, which will result
in a consequently different identity of authorship, whenever an operator in
place is not the author of the original file entry and data. Yet, this limitation
can be overcome by according constraints concerning the authorization of
such operations and procedures to retain original file data including the
corresponding File Certificate.
Certified Grid jobs The introduced functionality of certified Grid jobs in-
troduces no additional remote invocations or callbacks between Grid Client
Interfaces and Grid Services and preserves the natural calling scheme of a job
submission. Also, no renewal or refreshment or storage of exploitable user
credentials is required, as the concept of certified Grid jobs as credentials
for delegation grant no other privileges than the execution of respectively
specified jobs.
The mechanism enables dynamic delegation and splitting of Grid job
requests into sub jobs and affords traceability and non-repudiation of both
submissions and intermediate processing (see Objective 4.4). Concerning
the revocation of Grid users’ access or corresponding X.509 certificates, pre-
viously created File and Job Certificates are not invalidated by a revocation
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and their authenticity and authorship persists.
Furthermore, due to the introduced functionality the necessary privi-
leges of the GJA can be reduced according to the least-privilege principle,
whereby a GJA requires no higher privileges than allowing the retrieval
of Job Certificates as job requests. Hence, threats like the proliferation of
attacks, e.g. due to anew Grid job submission, can be dissolved.
Based on the combination of File and Job Certificates, it is possible to
assure not only a Job Certificate’s authenticity and authorship, but also the
authenticity and authorship of all Grid files referred to from within a Job
Certificate. Therefore, it is possible to largely simplify the detection of illegal
or improper behavior of the environment of a Grid job on a WN, being able
to refer to a Job Certificate as well as File Certificates of involved file entries
as the expected and requested behavior.
The significance of the mechanisms concerning non-repudiation and
potential responsibility of Grid users in the face of security incidents, is
discussed as follows: in case a hostile or malicious Grid job is executed, while
presuming an environment of integrity of the Grid job on a WN, malicious
code can be assumed to be either provided directly within the Grid files
referred to via the specification of the job, or by reference to external data
source, e.g. via the Internet. In the course of forensic analysis of the Grid job,
evidence would need to be identified within the Grid job specification and its
input files, which would be assumed to reveal either respective instructions
or at least a request to retrieve data from external sources. In both cases,
the Job Certificate and File Certificates together facilitate non-repudiation of
the respective submission. In case a Grid job refers to or involves malicious
data or operations not connected to the job submitter, the responsibilities
can be clearly identified. Also the transformations of an original submission
can be transparently identified and verified later on based on the cascaded
signatures in the Job Certificate.
A remaining issue concerns the possible deletion or overwriting of Grid
files, e.g. as a measure in order to cover up traces. Although, based on the
runtime of a Grid job and the modification timestamp of Grid files in the
File Certificate, such an event could be possibly identified, the original or
foregoing content of a deleted or modified Grid file could presumably not
be recovered. Potential solutions could be a temporary blocking of deletion
requests or a deferred deletion functionality concerning Grid files ’recently’
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utilized within Grid jobs.
Finally, in the events of e.g. malicious Grid applications, an infected or
attacked Site’s infrastructure and WNs or a VO’s Central Grid Services, the
presented mechanisms will ensure that no counterfeit evidence for a Grid
job submitter’s responsibility can be created. Generally, the utilization of
File and Job Certificates will allow to limit a Site’s and WN’s permissions to
the necessary minimum. Hence, File and Job Certificates can protect sincere
users from false accusation and, if necessary, facilitate users to defend their
reputation.
System integrity and confidentiality Due to the enforced authorization,
limited permissions of VO- and Site-based services and verifiable interac-
tions and processing, the presented mechanisms afford escalated protection
against malicious behavior and both internal and external attackers, in par-
ticular in combination with the envisioned use of an isolation mechanism
for Grid jobs during their execution. Together with mutually authenticated
and encrypted connections, a Grid layer’s system integrity can be protected
with respect to illegitimate access (see Objective 4.2 and Objective 4.3) and
interception and illicit information retrieval (see Objective 4.5).
Availability The presented mechanisms of Grid file system consistency,
certified Grid files and on-demand storage discovery facilitate an assured
and transparent handling of replicated data as well as of potential errors and
failover. Together with the mechanism of certified Grid jobs, transparent
processing and executions of Grid jobs are further achieved due to the the
feasibility of verifiable rollbacks. In the event of any errors or outages, a
failover of the Grid job execution as simply a anew submission of concerned
Grid jobs becomes possible (see Objective 4.3).
8.5 Summary
This chapter presented a new security architecture for e-Science Grids es-
tablished on the framework of mediated definite delegation (see Chapter 7),
with user-signed File Certificates for Grid files and user- and subsequently
service-signed Job Certificates for Grid jobs as conversions of the framework’s
authorship declaration and mediated delegation.
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Within the security architecture, all communication via untrusted net-
works is required to be mutually authenticated and encrypted.
Preserving the e-Science Grid architecture’s separation of logical Grid
File Catalogs and distributed Storage Elements (SEs) for physical storage (see
Chapter 7), the security architecture involves a Grid file access mechanism
based on service-signed tickets in order to grant Grid users physical data
access on SEs. In case of write operations, SE-signed tickets, replied by
SEs to the Grid File Catalog’s services via Grid users, are utilized in order
to confirm authenticity of Grid file data during write operations together
with user-signed File Certificates as declarations of authorship. Further
on, an introduced booking table within the Grid file access mechanism
assures consistency of transactions and enforceable authorization as well
as transparent cancellation and rollback of Grid file operations. A dynamic
discovery of SEs allows for the transparent utilization of data replication
and failover as well as for load-balancing and automated data distribution.
In matters of Grid job submission, user- and service-signed Job Certifi-
cates as mediated delegations enable a transparent cancellation and rollback
of Grid job processing and execution whenever necessary. Moreover, the
security architecture and its Job Certificates prepare for the utilization of
isolation mechanisms for Grid job execution.
The security architecture’s File and Job Certificates afford integrity and
authenticity of the respective entities and non-repudiation of their author-
ship as well as verifiable Grid job submissions and processing. Hence,
meaningful decision-making with respect to the traceability of Grid files
and jobs can be achieved.
As such and beyond the underlying framework of mediated definite
delegation, the presented e-Science Grid security architecture facilitates the
fulfillment of the security objectives defined in Chapter 4.5.
"All I really had was a suitcase and my
drums. So I took them up to Seattle and
hoped it would work."
Dave Grohl
9
A Grid Middleware Prototype
The presented security architecture (see Chapter 8) has been implemented
to large extents as a prototype within the framework of a central Grid
middleware project, called jAliEn [22]. This chapter will present and specify
the prototype’s implementation.
After a presentation of the secured communication implemented in
the jAliEn Grid middleware prototype, its central communication protocol
based on the exchange of serialized Java objects will be specified, which
represents a core feature also with respect to security concerns. Further
on, the prototype’s design and arrangement of central and Site-based Grid
services and the Grid client interfaces will be presented. Subsequently, the
implementation of certified Grid Files and Jobs as a proof of concept will be
specified, and finally, the capacity of the prototype will be demonstrated in
a comprehensive performance evaluation.
Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been presented in [PUB9,
PUB12].
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9.1 Secured Communication
All network-based communication of jAliEn Grid services is established via
mutually authenticated and encrypted connections, utilizing the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) [70] protocol with X.509 certificate-based authentication
based on the Bouncy Castle Crypto API [130]. This includes a client-based
service that establishes the connection to the Grid layer for every client
system. This client-based service functions as a local service to actual client
interfaces, while using a different local connection schema (see Section 9.4).
The mutual authentication of jAliEn Grid services is based on Grid
user’s X.509 certificates on part of the client-based service and X.509 host
certificates for any other Grid services. Upon startup of a jAliEn service,
an X.509 certificate and the corresponding key is loaded from a password-
protected file container into a Java Keystore [106]. Accordingly an unprotected
storage of loaded credentials, e.g. on a file system or a shell environment,
can be avoided.
9.2 Serialized Java Object Streams
Within the mutually authenticated and encrypted connections, the commu-
nication of jAliEn Grid services is established exclusively by the exchange of
serialized Java objects, analogous to Java Remote Method Invocation [107].
Further, the network-based communication of any pair of jAliEn Grid ser-
vices is arranged via a single persistent connection, which is reestablished
automatically whenever interrupted. Hence, all Grid services communicate
via secured and persistent connections via the exchange of serialized Java
objects. Thereby the exchange of serialized Java objects is restricted to ob-
jects of classes known to both communicating peers beforehand and the
exchange of only object values, viz. no class definitions are exchanged.
API On top of this serialized object exchange, an application programming
interface (API) within the Java program code handles code-internal requests
for objects. All components operating on this API become completely in-
dependent of their environment, viz. the API is equally utilized within the
different services of the Grid middleware including client- and Site-based
services.
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Dispatcher Below this API, a request dispatcher entity handles incom-
ing requests based on the capacity of the respective process: in case the
dispatcher entity is executed within a central Grid service it will directly
process the request, while in the opposite case the request is sent to a central
Grid service as a serialized object for remote processing. In both cases the
dispatcher entity will return the respective response object of a request in
identical manner, regardless if it was locally processed or received as a
serialized object after remote processing. The dispatcher entity’s behavior
is triggered only within runtime of the program code via configuration
parameters. In case it encounters the configuration of a non-central Grid
service it automatically initiates the establishment of a connection to a given
central Grid service, which potentially is itself a non-central Grid service.
The latter is facilitated due to the universality of the API and the dispatcher
entity, which allows a non-central Grid service to externally operate alike a
central Grid service, and accept and handle requests from other Grid ser-
vices, which are then sent for remote processing transparently. Presuming
according secured connections, this design allows to concatenate several
non-central Grid services, with only the ’last’ one in the assemblage re-
quiring a connection to a central Grid service in order to provide remote
processing of requests for all non-central Grid services in the chain.
Request The central entity of the API is a Request class, which is in-
herited by all possible requests. The class handles generally relevant request
attributes, for instance the username in favor of which the request is created
as well as potential Java exceptions that occurred during the processing
of a requests. In case a request is sent via object serialization to a remote
service for processing it will further contain information of the requester’s
X.509 certificate, in order to facilitate e.g. verifications of identities or digital
signatures. This information is provided by the dispatcher entity based on
the established TLS connection via which the request is exchanged. Hence,
remote requests can be implicitly authenticated based on the authentication
of the respective connection and the therefore utilized X.509 certificates.
Examples of requests utilized via the API as descendants of the Request
class are the retrieval of a Logical File Name (LFN) object by an LFN string,
the retrieval of an Access Ticket for an SE and the submission of a Grid
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job by passing on a signed JDL. Consequently, all conceptual Grid entities
handled within the middleware, such as LFNs, Physical File Names or
Grid Job JDLs, are implemented as Java classes and strict enforcement of
authorizations and verifications can be easily achieved, using fine-grained
controls on object attributes.
9.3 Central and Site-based Grid Services
The persistency back-end of jAliEn, with a central Grid File Catalog and
Grid Task Queue, is an extension of the respective implementation within
the AliEn middleware project (see Section 3.1), utilizing SQL databases. Fur-
ther, the utilization of a central LDAP directory service and the according
LDAP schema were adopted from AliEn.
Persistency The databases-established persistency back-end is fully en-
capsulated via another API within jAliEn. This low-level API facilitates the
mapping of Grid entity objects within the middleware, such as objects of
LFNs, Physical File Names or Grid Job JDLs, to database queries within the
Grid File Catalog and Grid Task Queue. Hence, the jAliEn Grid middleware
is apart from this API’s components completely independent of its persis-
tency back-end, which also represents an implicit protection against SQL or
alike code injections by clients.
Services Within jAliEn, one central Grid service, named jCentral, pro-
vides central Grid layer access to client and Site services. The main Site
service and Grid Site Agent, named jSite, is assumed to operate on a VO-Box
and acts as a communication router for the jAliEn Grid Job Agent, called
jAgent.
Service aggregation As the connection schema of all jAliEn Grid ser-
vices is identical, jSite services can be optionally cascaded, allowing various
levels of aggregation and routing (see Section 9.2). In particular both Site
and client services (specified hereafter) can be equally aggregated via such
service instances as connection routers, which represents a novelty and ex-
tension with respect to the service layout of the e-Science Grid architecture
(see Section 3.3). Based on this aggregation and routing functionality it
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would be possible to establish federated structures or interconnections of
Virtual Organizations (VOs). This has so far only been supported in the
perspective of the connection and service schema, and has not further been
implemented with respect to a view and domain separation of multiple
VOs within the Grid data and job layer of an e-Science Grid. Moreover, the
handling of requests in plaintext within the API and dispatcher entity must
be considered, which as such allows no confidential information exchange
via the routing Grid service.
9.4 Grid Client Interfaces
In order to provide for single sign-on access via Grid Client Interfaces, a
client service entity named jBox is introduced. Upon startup on a Grid user’s
operating system, the user’s X.509 certificate and the corresponding key are
loaded and the jBox instance is dispatched as a process daemon.
jBox Once initialized, the jBox service immediately establishes a per-
sistent connection to the jCentral service and sets up itself as a local service,
listening on the operating system’s loopback network interface and provid-
ing connectivity for Grid Client Interfaces via a line-based protocol. The
service’s port address and a generated authentication token are placed in
a specified temporary file, protected from other operating system user’s
access via the file system’s permissions.
jSh A Grid Client Interface, named jSh, provides a Grid user with
command-line-based access to the Grid layer, while its functionality and
command set is analogous to the AliEn Shell (see Section 3.1.2). The jSh
interface can be started and stopped by a user independently of the local
jBox service executed in background as a process daemon. Upon startup, jSh
retrieves the jBox instance’s port address and the authentication token from
the temporary file and subsequently connects to the jBox service. The local
connection between the jBox instance and the jSh client is unencrypted, and
is consequently only protected by the resilience of the operating system’s
loopback network interface against potential listening attacks.
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jRoot With respect to a potential adoption of the jAliEn Grid middle-
ware within the ALICE experiment, an adapted version of the ROOT AliEn
Interface (see Section 3.1.2), named jRoot, was developed as an interface
library for the experiment’s physics analysis framework AliRoot [6]. Anal-
ogous to the jSh interface, jRoot connects directly to the jBox instance and
provides Grid layer access, e.g. to the Grid file system, for an analysis frame-
work instance on a Grid user’s system, or to a framework instance started
within a Grid job (specified hereafter).
The jAliEn connection schema of all client-side entities and their connec-
tions is illustrated in Figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1: jAliEn, connection of Grid Client Interfaces.
Interface independence The line-based protocol utilized by the jSh and
jRoot interfaces for communication with the jBox service exchanges textual
information only using a simple request and response scheme. The received
textual requests are translated within the jBox service into object requests
to the central API, with the consequently received response objects being
again translated into textual replies to the interfaces. Hence, this protocol as
well as the local interfaces are independent of the Java object exchange, and
consequently of the Java programming language, and can be implemented
independently. While the jSh interface is implemented in Java nevertheless,
the jRoot interface is implemented as a C++ library in order to allow its
utilization within the AliRoot framework.
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9.5 Grid Data and Job Layer Security
The defined Grid security architecture (see Chapter 8) was implemented
within the jAliEn Grid middleware prototype. With respect to architecture’s
mechanisms of Grid data layer security, the Booking Table, the SE access
via Access and Status Tickets and the on-demand SE discovery are fully
implemented. Consequently, the middleware provides full access to a Grid
File Catalog with the physical data storage being established on provided
SEs, which are accessible via the XRootD protocol. The implementation of
Access and Status Tickets utilizes the SHA384withRSA scheme for digital
signatures, provided by the Bouncy Castle Crypto API. The prototype imple-
mentation, however, does not include generation and usage of the defined
File Certificates.
In matters of the Grid security architecture’s mechanisms of Grid job
layer security, the prototype implementation represents a functional proof
of concept of certified Grid jobs. This implementation as well as envisioned
functionality will be specified within the following paragraphs and is fur-
ther illustrated in Figure 9.2.
Grid job submission Upon Grid job submission, the jBox service digitally
signs the Grid job request using the Grid user’s private key, corresponding
to its X.509 certificate, and submits it to the jCentral service. There, the Grid
user’s signature and validity are verified before the job is authorized and
placed into the Grid Task Queue. If not available already, the Grid user’s
certificate is stored in a central certificate database.
jAgent The jAgent service is developed as a Grid Job Agent within a
pilot job model [42, 58], though there is so far no support for a submission of
jAgent requests to a resource management system, and jAgent instances are
required to be started manually. In matters of authentication and identifica-
tion of a jAgent service instance, a random numerical identifier is utilized
within the prototype implementation.
Provided with an X.509 certificate and a corresponding private key, a jA-
gent instance creates its numerical identifier upon startup and establishes a
persistent connection to its dedicated jSite service. Subsequently, it requests
Grid jobs via its jSite service connection from the jCentral service, while
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specifying the numerical identifier.
With respect to a future pilot job model, the creation of an identifier
would be required to be further adapted to the submission of jAgent re-
quests by the jSite service, as well as the supply of the X.509 certificate and a
corresponding private key.
Grid job processing If a waiting job in the Grid Task Queue exists, the
job’s user-signed Grid job request is processed and digitally signed by the
jCentral service, using the private key of the service’s X.509 host certificate,
resulting in a valid Job Certificate. Subsequently, the job is marked in the
Grid Task Queue to be taken by the jAgent instance, referring to the pro-
vided numerical identifier, and the Job Certificate is sent together with the
submitter’s X.509 certificate to the jAgent service.
Grid job execution Once receiving the Job Certificate the jAgent ver-
ifies both digital signatures, while the X.509 host certificate used by the
jCentral service is statically provided. In case of a successful verification,
necessary Grid files are downloaded to the WN from an SE, the Grid job is
executed by the jAgent and its output files are uploaded to an SE and regis-
tered in the Grid File Catalog. The read and write access within a jAgent
instance utilizes Access and Status Tickets (see Section 8.1), the requests
are though so far only authenticated and authorized based on the jAgent’s
identifier, viz. the Job Certificate is not used as a credential.
Job Certificate A simplified example of a Job Certificate with two ap-
plied signatures as utilized within jAliEn is given in Listing 9.1. The Job
Certificate’s digital signatures are based on the Bouncy Castle Crypto API,
using the SHA384withRSA signature scheme.
For each digital signature, the job signature mechanism appends five sig-
nature tags as key-value-pairs to a JDL, or an already signed JDL. The key-
value pairs Signature_Issued and Signature_Expires represent the timestamps
for validity of the respective delegation. The Signature_HashOrd specifies
the order the JDL key-value pairs appearance in the character string that is
digitally signed. Hence, a JDL as well as a signed JDL or Job Certificate can
be processed as a data object containing an unsorted set of key-value pairs
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without respecting their order. Further on, the Signature_CertSerial defines
the serial number of the X.509 certificate utilized for a digital signature.
Before its digital signature, the four key-value pairs of Signature_Issued, Sig-
nature_Expires, Signature_HashOrd and Signature_CertSerial are appended
to a JDL’s character string, as specified by Signature_HashOrd. Finally, the
Signature_SHA384withRSA key-value pair with the digital signature of the
signed JDL is appended.
OutputFile = "stdout,stderr,resource";
2 JDLPath = "/jalien/user/j/jay/testjob";
Executable = "/jalien/user/j/jay/bin/date";
4 Signature_Issued* = 1378527416;
Signature_Expires* = 1379737016;
6 Signature_HashOrd* = "Executable-[...]-Signature_CertSerial";
Signature_CertSerial* = "869671";
8 Signature_SHA384withRSA* = "mfgiWjT [...] FuJA8juK1Kzw==";
User = "jay";
10 Signature_Issued = 1378527420;
Signature_Expired = 1379737020;
12 Signature_HashOrd = "Executable-[...]-Signature_CertSerial";
Signature_CertSerial = "321957";
14 Signature_SHA384withRSA = "lsKwOrb [...] ntpSlBE0vAAQ==";
Listing 9.1: A sample Job Certificate (hashing orders and signatures
truncated).
In case an initially signed Grid job request is to be signed a second time
due to the creation of a File Certificate, the mechanism appends an asterisk
’*’ as a marker to the respective tags of the previous signature. The marked
tags become part of the signed character string, thereby preventing a mix-up
of tags of the two signatures. While new key-value pairs can be added
to a JDL during its processing, key-value pairs existing in initial JDLs can
also be modified (transformed) by the central Grid service as a broker. In
this case, the initial key-value pairs are also marked by an asterisk, and
new key-value pairs are appended additionally. Hence, it is possible to
reproduce the initial form of a JDL or Grid job request and verify both the
transformations applied and the corresponding first signature.
In contrast to the framework of mediated definite delegation (see Section
7.3), the implementations of the initially signed Grid job request and the
File Certificate do so far not contain any identity of the broker or agent the
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respective request is assigned to. This feature can though be directly im-
plemented based on the distinguished names (DNs) of the respective X.509
certificates, utilized by the jCentral and jAgent services. The DNs must then
be appended as an according key-value pair to the Grid job requests before
their signature.
Figure 9.2: jAliEn Site services: jSite, jAgent and jBox.
Grid job data access and Grid job isolation By an according extension of
the prototype implementation, the jBox instance jRoot interface can further
enable access to the Grid layer during a Grid job’s execution. Therefore a
jAgent service would be required to start a jBox instance before a Grid job is
executed. Using the jRoot interface, an analysis framework instance within
a running Grid job could then be provided with Grid layer access via the
local jBox service, analogous to the scenario on a Grid user’s system. In
order to transparently separate accesses of different concurrently executed
Grid jobs, a respective authentication token would be required for every
Grid job executed, in order to allow the establishment of a connection of the
jRoot interface and the jBox instance. Equal to the Grid file accesses by a
jAgent, Grid file system accesses requested via the jRoot interface could then
be authorized based on a legitimation within the respective Job Certificate.
In matters of Grid job Execution Protection (see Section 8.2.3), the WN
service layout of jAliEn, with its jAgent and jBox services, and the func-
tionality of the jRoot interface was designed in order to directly support
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scenarios involving mechanisms for Grid job isolation, such as gLExec [86]
or virtualization: the Grid job execution is fully independent of the jAgent
service and the connection of the jBox service and the jRoot interface is only
based on the loopback network interface. In a scenario involving virtualiza-
tion, this connection could be utilized via a virtual network interface within
a respective virtual machine that is connected to the loopback interface of
the physical host.
9.6 Performance Evaluation
In the following section a performance evaluation of the jAliEn Grid middle-
ware prototype will be presented. In three different tests, the middleware’s
performance was evaluated, while two tests involved a comparison with
the AliEn middleware.
The first performance test is a comparison of jAliEn and AliEn Grid
Client Interfaces in terms of scalability based on concurrent Grid job submis-
sions in an isolated test environment. Within the second test, the scalability
of the jAliEn middleware is further analyzed in the same setup concerning
concurrent Grid File Catalog directory listings as relatively simple, small
and fast requests. The final third test is a study of the jAliEn middleware
and the AliEn Grid Client Interfaces in terms of latency via an Internet-based
connection and measures the response time of consecutive Grid File Catalog
directory listing requests
Architectural comparison of AliEn and jAliEn The AliEn Perl Shell as
well as the AliEn Shell (see Sections 3.1.2) utilize a string-based transmis-
sion of printout values. Hence, a client-side command, such as a directory
listing within the Grid file system, is sent as a single request to AliEn central
services. There the respective command’s result is fully assembled, and,
once sent to the client, directly printed out on the interface’s screen. The
connection is thereby established for each single request.
In contrast, service communication in jAliEn is based on the serialized
Java object exchange protocol within a persistent connection, and requests
are executed object by object with the screen printout being assembled by
the client-side jBox service. Finally, the connections of AliEn Perl Shell,
AliEn Shell and jBox with their respective Central Grid Services are based
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on different authentication and encryption mechanisms (compare Sections
5.1 and 9.1), while most importantly the AliEn Shell interface uses a propri-
etary authentication token and only client-to-service-side encryption. These
architectural differences will be further considered within the results of the
following tests.
9.6.1 Stress Test of Grid Job Submission
Concerning the potential performance impact of the Grid job signature
mechanism of the jAliEn prototype implementation, and its scalability with
respect to concurrent Grid job submission requests to its jCentral service, an
according stress test was performed. In order to further allow for compari-
son, the stress test was equally applied to the AliEn middleware and its two
Grid Client Interfaces, AliEn Perl Shell and AliEn Shell.
The tests were established in laboratory conditions, using three test
machines: one machine (Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 2.80GHz, 8GB RAM, solid-
state drive) was providing all necessary Central Grid Services, including
required databases and a directory service, with both jAliEn and AliEn
services deployed to operate on the same virtual Grid configuration, using
the same Grid File Catalog and Grid Task Queue. Two other machines were
utilized as clients, hereafter referred to as ’Client A’ (Intel i5 CPU 2.50GHz,
8GB RAM, solid-state drive) and ’Client B’ (Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 1.86GHz,
4GB RAM, solid-state drive). For all tests, an X.509 CA certificate with a
4096bit RSA public key and X.509 certificates with 2048bit RSA public keys
were utilized for mutual authentication as well as for the signature of Grid
job submissions in the jAliEn middleware. The signature in the jAliEn Grid
job submission was based on the SHA384withRSA signature protocol via the
BouncyCastle [130] provider.
For each of the Grid Client interfaces, different numbers of concurrent
job submissions were independently tested as different test settings. In each
setting the submissions were executed on both client machines side by side
and the results were taken for exactly 300 seconds. For all three interfaces in
all tested settings, the evaluation statistics were composed as the average,
minimum and maximum response time and the count of successful job
submissions, and the according average frequency rate of requests that was
reached by the two clients.
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In all tests the same minimal Grid job JDL was submitted, with a size of
79 bytes, specifying only an executable and output files, while the JDL con-
tent was directly provided as an input parameter to the command. The mea-
surement referred to the request-to-response wall time of a job submission,
viz. the time of submission till the service states its successful placement
in the Grid Task Queue by replying an identifier of the queued job. The
time measurements were taken in all three implementations internally via
adaptions in the respective program code, while in JAliEn the measurements
were taken directly within the jBox service. Hence, the line-based local con-
nection to a jSh instance over the loopback network device was not included.
Average: Min.: Max.: Count: Freq.:
20 submission threads per client (2p10t)
Client A 22ms 13ms 284ms 28068 94Hz
Client B 28ms 20ms 467ms 21489 72Hz
20 submission threads per client (10p2t)
Client A 71ms 15ms 742ms 42172 141Hz
Client B 125ms 28ms 849ms 23629 79Hz
1000 submission threads per client (20p50t)
Client A 147ms 16ms 1s 42106 140Hz
Client B 282ms 43ms 1.5s 20159 67Hz
1000 submission threads only on Client A (20p50t)
Client A 146ms 21ms 879ms 41136 137Hz
Client B - - - 0 0.00Hz
2000 submission threads per client (20p100t)
Client A 143ms 20ms 845ms 41162 137Hz
Client B 282ms 64ms 1.3s 20223 67Hz
Table 9.1: jAliEn, concurrent submissions of signed Grid jobs in loop per
client.
jAliEn The jAliEn Grid Client Interface was tested in different settings
of 20, 100 and 2000 concurrently processing loops of submission requests
on the two independent clients. The looped concurrent submissions were
established by a number of jBox service instances, with inside each instance
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a number of internal Java-based threads continuously issued job submis-
sions. Due to the architecture of jBox, the internal threads of a jBox instance
(hereinafter referred to as a process) shared one persistent connection to the
jCentral service within each setting. The different test settings are therefore
additionally marked with an according number of jBox processes and in-
ternal Java-based threads. Table 9.1 presents the statistics of the different
settings of the jAliEn middleware.
For 20 concurrent Grid job submissions in loop per client, the results
show a dependency with respect to the setup of processes and threads: in
the first setting, each client executed 2 processes and 10 threads (2p10t) and
had consequently two connections to the jCentral service. In the second
setting, each client executed 10 processes and 2 threads (10p2t) and had
consequently ten connections to the jCentral service. The response times
in the first setting are considerably lower, which could be explained by a
pooling of threads with respect to the number of connections. At the same
time the total number and frequency of submissions is though significantly
lower, which cannot be explained and is simply taken as an identified
dependency.
Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.4 show the according histograms for these set-
tings, and Figure 9.5 shows a histogram of 1000 concurrent Grid job submis-
sions in loop.
Figure 9.3: jAliEn jSh: Two clients with each 20 concurrent Grid job sub-
missions in loop (2p10t).
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Figure 9.4: jAliEn jSh: Two clients with each 20 concurrent Grid job sub-
missions in loop (10p2t).
Figure 9.5: jAliEn jSh: Two clients with each 1000 concurrent Grid job
submissions in loop (20p50t).
The settings of 20, 1000 and 2000 concurrent Grid job submissions in loop
per client show a correlation in total number and frequency of submissions.
This correlation was further confirmed by a setting involving only 1000
concurrent Grid job submissions by client A, while client B was excluded in
this setting: the highest frequency measured with client A is approximately
at 140 submission requests per second, even if the jCentral service was
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able to process more than 200 submission requests per second in settings
involving both clients. Hence, it was obviously not possible to achieve an
overloading of the jCentral service by the presented settings, and the clients
reached a certain limitation. This limitation is assumed to be related to
the computationally more expensive digital signature of the job request
on client-side, in comparison to the signature’s service-side verification.
The client limitation as such was further confirmed by a corresponding
performance test of Grid File Catalog access, presented hereafter in Section
9.6.2.
In summary, the client-side limitation allowed for a frequency up to more
than 200 verified and accepted Grid jobs per second by the jCentral service
(combined Client A and B). Thereby the average response time remained be-
low 300 milliseconds in all test settings, while the worst maximum response
time measured was at 1.5 seconds. In order to identify a potential influence
of the digital signature of a job request within a submission, two test settings
involved the disabling of the job signature, viz. the job requests were sub-
mitted only as plain and unsigned JDL listings. The statistics of these two
settings are presented in Table 9.2, in which the frequency of submissions
per second increased with a factor of roughly two to three in comparison to
the test settings of signed submissions. The maximum response times were
relatively higher, which is assumed to be a result of a relatively increased
load on the jCentral service indicated by the higher frequency. Finally, the
average response time of unsigned submissions were lower than the respec-
tive signed submissions again with a factor of approximately two to three.
Average: Min.: Max.: Count: Freq.:
20 unsigned submission threads per client (2p10t)
Client A 11ms 4ms 659ms 53784 179Hz
Client B 12ms 5ms 663ms 51357 171Hz
1000 unsigned submission threads per client (20p50t)
Client A 71ms 5ms 1.4s 86198 287Hz
Client B 94ms 6ms 6.6s 59553 199Hz
Table 9.2: jAliEn, concurrent unsigned Grid job submissions in loop per
client.
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AliEn The two AliEn Grid Client Interfaces AliEn Perl Shell and AliEn Shell
(see Section 3.1.2) were tested in three independent settings of 1, 10 and 20
concurrent Grid job submissions in loop on each client.
Table 9.3 presents the statistics of the three tested settings of the AliEn
Perl Shell.
Average: Min.: Max.: Count: Freq.:
1 submission thread per client
Client A 365ms 158ms 16.3s 791 2.64Hz
Client B 379ms 158ms 16.3s 771 2.57Hz
10 submission threads per client
Client A 3.0s 233ms 111.4s 751 2.50Hz
Client B 3.0s 408ms 84.1s 636 2.12Hz
20 submission threads per client
Client A 8.4s 370ms 249.5s 294 0.98Hz
Client B 28.2s 1.1s 248.9s 76 0.25Hz
Table 9.3: AliEn Perl Shell, concurrent Grid job submissions in loop per
client.
Figure 9.6: AliEn Perl Shell: Two clients with each 10 concurrent Grid job
submissions in loop.
At one concurrent Grid job submission in loop per client, the system was
able to perform roughly two and a half submissions per second. While the
120 Chapter 9. A Grid Middleware Prototype
average response time was below 400 milliseconds, the maximum response
time was approximately 16 seconds. At 10 concurrent Grid job submissions
in loop per client, the average response time escalated with the factor of 10
with respect to the previous setting and the maximum response time was
beyond one minute. Figure 9.6 shows the results of this setting.
In the setting of 20 concurrent Grid job submissions in loop per client, the
testing identified a strong overloading of the middleware and an according
depletion in performance.
The statistics of the three test settings of the AliEn Shell are shown
in Table 9.4. At one concurrent Grid job submission in loop per client,
Average: Min.: Max.: Count: Freq.:
1 submission thread per client
Client A 266ms 80ms 4.1s 967 3.22Hz
Client B 265ms 79ms 3.9s 956 3.19Hz
10 submission threads per client
Client A 2.7s 134ms 39.3s 1107 3.69Hz
Client B 2.7s 222ms 32.5s 1084 3.61Hz
20submission threads per client
Client A 4.8s 150ms 35.5s 1213 4.04Hz
Client B 4.7s 232ms 35.4s 1221 4.07Hz
Table 9.4: AliEn Shell, concurrent Grid job submissions in loop per client.
the system was able to perform roughly three submissions per second,
with an average response time below 300 milliseconds and a maximum
response time of approximately 4 seconds. The average response time
scaled with the number of concurrent Grid job submissions in loop across
the three settings, as did the maximum response time from 1 to 10 concurrent
Grid job submissions. The frequency was increased to approximately four
submissions per second in the setting of 20 concurrent Grid job submissions
in loop per client. Figure 9.7 shows the results of this setting. Also for
the case of the AliEn Shell, the test revealed a strong overloading of the
middleware and an according depletion in performance.
Considering the upper frequency rates of signed job submission in
jAliEn, the jCentral service was able to verify and accept more than 200
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Figure 9.7: AliEn Shell: Two clients with each 20 concurrent Grid job sub-
missions in loop.
submissions per second within these tests on standard hardware. Given
the average response time of any measured signed job submission below
300 milliseconds and the mechanism’s robustness in terms of scalability, the
identified impact factor of two to three of the digital signature processing is
assessed to represent no fundamental disadvantage in performance.
In case of the second signature applied to a Grid job request upon prop-
agation to a Site as a File Certificate, the computationally more expensive
digital signature would be applied by the jCentral service and the verifi-
cation would be conducted by jSite services. Accordingly, the presented
test results are assumed to apply reciprocally as a lower limit, as the test
involved the concurrent generation of requests on client side, each requiring
a digital signature.
In conclusion, considering the measured response times and frequen-
cies and the identified behavior in terms of scalability of the AliEn Grid
Client Interfaces, the jAliEn prototype revealed a considerable performance
potential within this testing. In matters of a comparison with the AliEn
middleware, the jAliEn middleware exceeded by large all reference values
presented by the AliEn middleware implementations, despite its digitally
signed submissions.
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9.6.2 Stress Test of Grid File Directory Listing
Within a second scalability and stress test, the performance of Grid File
Catalog accesses was evaluated based on directory listing requests.
The following results refer to the same testing setup as presented in
the previous Section (see Section 9.6.1), while only involving the jAliEn
middleware and replacing the Grid job submission by a directory listing
request on a directory containing 20 file entries. Again, the requests where
issued by the two clients with different numbers of independent request
loops and the results were taken for 300 seconds.
The statistics of the different settings of 20, 100, 500 and 2000 concurrently
processing loops of requests on each client are presented in Table 9.5. Figure
Average: Min.: Max.: Count: Freq.:
20 ls request threads per client (2p10t)
Client A 7ms 3ms 181ms 90458 302Hz
Client B 9ms 5ms 177ms 33740 113Hz
100 ls request threads per client (2p50t)
Client A 9ms 4ms 860ms 66677 222Hz
Client B 10ms 5ms 865ms 60587 202Hz
100 ls request threads per client (2p50t) memory opt.
Client A 9ms 4ms 622ms 67195 224Hz
Client B 10ms 5ms 622ms 60939 203Hz
500 ls request threads per client (10p50t)
Client A 42ms 4ms 996ms 72301 241Hz
Client B 44ms 5ms 992ms 60763 203Hz
500 ls request threads per client (5p100t)
Client A 21ms 4ms 1311ms 74691 249Hz
Client B 21ms 5ms 687ms 59211 197Hz
500 ls request threads only on Client A (5p100t)
Client A 12ms 4ms 712ms 129358 431Hz
Client B - - - 0 0Hz
2000 ls request threads per client (20p100t)
ClientA 85ms 4ms 1234ms 73345 245Hz
ClientB 93ms 5ms 1347ms 59557 199Hz
Table 9.5: jAliEn, concurrent threads of looped requests for directory en-
tries per client.
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9.8 and Figure 9.9 show further the results of the test settings of 100 and
1000 concurrent request loops per client. In all test settings, the jCentral
responded to directory requests (for both clients combined) at a rate above
400 replies per second. Furthermore, in all but the last setting (20p100t), the
average response time was below 50 or even below 20 milliseconds, and for
2000 concurrent requests per client the average response time was below
100 milliseconds. Finally, the worst maximum response times measured
were below 1.5 seconds, and considerably lower in majority of settings.
The test was able to confirm the client dependency of the previous test
of concurrent job submissions by another setting involving only one client:
within this setting, an expected overtake of the spare performance of the
jCentral service with respect to only one client was identified, indicated by
the respective total count and frequency of responded requests.
Figure 9.8: jAliEn jSh: Two clients with each 100 concurrent directory re-
quests in loop (2p50t).
The yearly average rate of Grid file accesses (not directory listings) in
the ALICE Grid Services, measured as authorization requests to central
services, is approximately 230Hz [5], while corresponding daily average
rates at approximately 400Hz were measured during execution periods of
approximately 50k Grid jobs. Considering this as a reference point for a
requirement of performance, the jAliEn prototype implementation was able
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Figure 9.9: jAliEn jSh: Two clients with each 500 concurrent directory re-
quests in loop (10p50t).
to provide such rates for simple requests while operating on common and
non-specialized machines.
9.6.3 Latency Test of Grid File Directory Listing
The following test represents a comparison of the jAliEn prototype imple-
mentation and the AliEn middleware, arranged by an instantiation of both
middlewares within the ALICE Grid Services in production. The test as-
sessed the client-to-service response time for Grid File Catalog accesses in
terms of network latency and Internet-based connections.
The setup involved the in-production instance of the ALICE Grid Ser-
vices with its central services running at CERN (near Geneva) on part of the
AliEn Grid middleware, and a jAliEn jCentral service deployed on a test
machine at CERN, directly connected to the internal network of the ALICE
Central Grid Services. The jCentral service was further provided with access
to the in-production ALICE Grid File Catalog via a direct connection to the
ALICE directory server and database system back-end.
The test involved two different client-side locations: in one case, the
AliEn Perl Shell and AliEn Shell interfaces and the jBox service were exe-
cuted on a test machine at CERN, directly connected to the internal network
of the ALICE Central Grid Services, as a scenario with least-possible net-
work latency and no external network interference. In the other case, the
two interfaces and the jBox service were executed on a personal computer
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Figure 9.10: Berlin-to-CERN, detailed directory listing request [ ls -l ] re-
sponse times.
located in Berlin, while using a non-permanent Internet connection. This
second case was chosen in order to simulate a characteristic scenario of an
external Grid user connecting via the Internet, while incorporating latency
and Internet-traffic interference.
The test was further based on the two requests of a short and a detailed
listing of the same Grid File Catalog directory. The listings were requested
by executions of the commands [ls] and [ls -l] in each of the three implemen-
tations and had a resulting screen printout size of approximately 7k bytes for
the short and approximately 40k bytes for the detailed directory listing. The
measuring was based on the internal wall time, measured within the three
implementations’ program code, as the request-to-response time including
the preparation of the respective screen output, viz. the second timestamp
was taken before the output was sent to the screen for printout.
For both locations, the two requests were executed independently in
bunches of 100 cycles, with one cycle being a consecutive timing of each
of the three Grid Client Interfaces. This setting was repeated at various
times across several days, in order to assure variations concerning the sys-
tem load of the in-production ALICE Grid services and the Internet-traffic
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interference. The single bunches of the resulting four test cases were later
concatenated and analyzed in total. The combined results of the Berlin-
based detailed directory requests are shown in Figure 9.10, which are based
on 60 concatenated bunches and consequently 6000 requests by each of the
Grid Client Interfaces. The corresponding results of CERN-based requests
are shown in Figure 9.11, which are based 120 concatenated bunches and
consequently 12000 requests.
Figure 9.11: CERN-to-CERN, detailed directory listing request [ ls -l ] re-
sponse times.
The statistics of all the four cases of short and detailed directory list-
ings for CERN- and Berlin-based requests were calculated based on the
combined bunches as the average, minimum and maximum response time
and the number of request errors, with the errors not considered within the
preceding calculations. Table 9.6 shows the statistics of the Berlin-based
requests, and Table 9.7 the corresponding statistics of CERN-based requests.
Critical assessment The test compared two interfaces and respective
services of a loaded in-production system with an interface connected to an
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Average: Minimum: Maximum: Errors:
Short directory listing request [ ls ] statistics
AliEn Perl Shell 638ms 522ms 5.7s 1
AliEn Shell 717ms 640ms 3.1s 7
jAliEn jSh 553ms 419ms 1.9s 3
Detailed directory listing request [ ls -l ] statistics
AliEn Perl Shell 722ms 578ms 26.9s 11
AliEn Shell 931ms 810ms 5.9s 28
jAliEn jSh 567ms 428ms 1.7s 13
Table 9.6: Berlin-to-CERN, directory listing request statistics.
Average: Minimum: Maximum: Errors:
Short directory listing [ ls ]:
AliEn Perl Shell 291ms 205ms 11,0s 0
AliEn Shell 144ms 110ms 2.0s 2
jAliEn jSh 77ms 46ms 1.3s 16
Detailed directory listing [ ls -l ]:
AliEn Perl Shell 324ms 231ms 4.4s 0
AliEn Shell 169ms 130ms 1.8s 0
jAliEn jSh 78ms 48ms 1.2s 26
Table 9.7: CERN-to-CERN, directory listing request statistics.
otherwise idle service, which needs to be considered as a general limitation
for its significance. Nevertheless, the interdependence and impact of the
commonly used instance of the ALICE Grid File Catalog, and the respective
database back-end, as well as any network-related conditions or influences
accounted equally for all three cases. Moreover, the directory listing was
chosen as a basic and relatively fast request, and the measurements were
distributed over several days, in order to potentially capture time frames of
different levels of load.
Evaluation and interpretation Concerning the results for the jAliEn mid-
dleware only, the average response time for Berlin-based requests was below
600 milliseconds for both request types, and the corresponding average re-
sponse time for CERN-based requests was below 80 milliseconds. The
maximum response time for Berlin-based requests was below 2 seconds and
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below 1.3 seconds for CERN-based requests. The consistency of the results
of short and detailed requests was anticipated, as due to the serialized Java
object exchange protocol the two requests account for the same Grid File
Catalog objects to be transmitted to the client. Concerning the high error
rates of the jAliEn interface, a synchronization bug of Java threads in the im-
plementation of the jBox service was identified. The bug remained unfixed
during the testing and is assumed to have caused at least a fraction of the
measured errors.
An unexpected result of the tests are the average rates of the AliEn
Shell interface for Berlin-based requests. Although the interface only uses
one-side encryption and had, compared with the AliEn Perl Shell interface,
relatively lower rates at CERN-based requests as expected, the rates were
relatively higher for Berlin-based requests. Due to the identical measuring
framework and the consistent observation of this result for both short and
detailed directory listings, it is suspected to be caused by the AliEn Shell
interface’s protocol with respect to latency or its packets’ Internet-based
treatment, yet this finding was not further investigated.
The in-production state of the ALICE Grid Services is assumed to have
only a small or potentially even negligible effect with respect to the one-time
best measured response time of each of the two AliEn interfaces. Hence,
these measured best response times can at least be considered as a general
reference point with respect to the target-setting and performance require-
ments of the ALICE experiment, as they represent the performance of an
actual system in place. Considering a comparison of the average response
times of the jAliEn interface with the minimum response times of the two
AliEn Grid Client Interfaces, the numbers are roughly equal for the case of
Berlin-based requests and below in case of CERN-based requests.
In conclusion, the test showed no fundamental performance deficits
of the jAliEn communication protocol with respect to latency, despite its
exchange of high-level Java objects and an underlying secured connection. In
matters of a comparison with the AliEn middleware, the jAliEn middleware
was able to clearly exceed the reference values presented by the AliEn
middleware implementations.
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9.7 Summary
In this chapter, a prototype implementation of the security architecture for
e-Science Grids (see Chapter 8) has been presented.
The prototype implementation within the jAliEn Grid middleware project
affords secured communication based on mutually authenticated and en-
crypted connections utilizing X.509 certificates and the Transport Layer
Security protocol. Its service communication protocol based on serialized
Java objects facilitates the exchange of complex high-level objects and an
according enforcement of access controls. A client-side service enables a
single sign-on capability of respective client interfaces. Utilized on a WN
this service functionality could further provide Grid layer access to Grid
jobs during their execution. Thereby, additional mechanisms for Grid job
isolation, such as gLExec [86] or virtualization, could be directly applied.
The prototype implementation represents a proof of concept of the pre-
viously presented e-Science Grid security architecture (see Chapter 8), most
importantly by its implementation of the mechanism of certified Grid jobs.
Its feasibility and capabilities were confirmed within the presented perfor-
mance evaluation, revealing a notable performance potential with respect to
service response times as well as to scalability and high loads.
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"The only reason for time is so that
everything doesn’t happen at once."
Albert Einstein
10
Conclusion
E-Science Grids provide the researchers of multiple and possibly otherwise
independent and globally distributed organizations with unified access to
large-scale computing and storage services. It is part of their purpose that
e-Science Grids allow collaborating researchers as users to introduce their
own data and program code in the course of their work. Beyond, via sub-
mission of Grid jobs any program code can be requested to be executed as
detached computational operation within the distributed computing infras-
tructure. The delegation of privileges in the course of Grid jobs submissions
in combination with the users’ allowance to introduce and utilize a priori
untrusted program code and data is though a widely identified security
challenge [78, 61, 121]. In response to this challenge, a new framework for
delegation and an according Grid security architecture have been presented
in this thesis.
On the basis of a study and comparison of the ALICE Grid Services as
a globally distributed e-Science Grid and other e-Science infrastructures
and approaches, a generic e-Science scenario has been defined. Further on,
the architecture of the in-use ALICE Grid services has been analyzed and
compared with architectures of other existing e-Science Grids. Based on this
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comparison, a generic e-Science Grid architecture has been defined.
In reference to the defined e-Science scenario and Grid architecture, the
involved players and their relationships, the security characteristics and
potential attack motives and targets have been specified, and according
security objectives have been defined.
In matters of in-use e-Science Grids and corresponding security mecha-
nisms, selected vulnerabilities of the ALICE Grid Services have been iden-
tified. Further on, the concept of delegation and its utilization in Grid
computing as well as the deficiencies of unrestricted delegation based on
X.509 proxy certificates have been analyzed and consequent vulnerabilities
have been examined and specified. Finally, further alternative approaches
for delegation and their capabilities were discussed.
Subsequently, a new delegation framework, named mediated definite
delegation, facilitating transparent, dynamic and least-privileged delegation
has been presented. The framework is based on textual statements for both
task delegations and attestation of data authorship, which are required to be
signed using public-key signature mechanisms. In case of task delegations,
cascaded signatures are utilized within the different steps of submission
and processing and propagation, while a task delegation can be processed
and propagated via more than one broker to an agent for execution. The
mechanisms afford non-repudiation of authorship of data as well as of
task delegations and their processing and propagation. Moreover, task
delegations as credentials afford protection against misuse of the delegating
user’s identity as well as against unnoticed alteration of the requested
actions. The framework and its mechanisms integrate completely into
the defined e-Science Grid architecture and require no remote callbacks or
additional invocations.
Established on the delegation framework and including further mecha-
nisms, a new security architecture for e-Science Grids has been presented.
The security architecture introduces user-signed File Certificates for Grid files
and user- and service-signed Job Certificates for Grid jobs as declarations of
authorship and statements of mediated delegation. It provides enforced
authorization for Grid layer access including storage-confirmed authentic-
ity of Grid file data and arranges for transparent cancellation and rollback
of Grid file and job operations. A dynamic discovery of physical storage
devices allows for the transparent utilization of data replication and failover
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as well as for load-balancing and automated data distribution. File and Job
Certificates afford integrity and authenticity of the respective entities and
non-repudiation of their authorship as well as verifiable Grid job submis-
sions and processing. Further on, the introduced Job Certificates prepare
for the utilization of isolation mechanisms for Grid job execution. Beyond
the underlying framework of mediated definite delegation, the presented
security architecture thereby facilitates the fulfillment of the defined security
objectives for e-Science Grids.
Finally, a prototype implementation of the new security architecture has
been presented as a proof of concept. An evaluation of the implementation’s
performance has revealed notable capacity with respect to service response
times as well as to scalability and high loads.
10.1 Future Work
The following paragraphs will outline potential future research related to
the work and results presented in this thesis.
Standardization The presented security architecture for e-Science Grids
and its mechanisms of File and Job Certificates rely on necessary definitions
and specifications within an infrastructure or environment. Concerning the
presented mechanism of Job Certificates, in particular the specification and
fixation of utilized data formats as well as allowed processing and trans-
formations have to be completed within the scope of an actual e-Science
Grid and the respective Virtual Organization. By standardization of data
formats and allowed transformations the mechanisms could be employed
beyond organizational borders of one or a dedicated set of e-Science Grids.
Hence, Job Certificates could be generally acknowledged as credentials for
authentication and authorization within a distributed infrastructure, and
thereby render the maintaining and, even more important, the control of
agent instances, such as the Site-based Grid Job Agent, by brokers or VOs
unnecessary.
Confidentiality of Grid files and jobs In both [112] as well as [45], Grid
security architectures providing confidential propagation of Grid data and
jobs based on public-key encryption are presented. In essence, a Grid job
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and necessary data are encrypted, using the public key of a service endpoint
provider or Site, and are decrypted by the provider or Site before the job’s
execution, using its private key. Accordingly, a submitted Grid job as well as
relevant data can be securely propagated from a user to a service endpoint
provider via intermediate processors.
This mechanisms could be combined with the herein presented work,
briefly outlined as follows: The mechanisms of both File and Job Certificates
could be directly applied to encrypted data and Grid job specifications, while
thereby equally providing authenticity, authorship and non-repudiation.
Encrypted Grid job requests could be signed and submitted by users, while
the Central Grid Services could process and propagate these job requests
and ’blindly’ apply their additional signatures. Hence, an endpoint provider
would be able to verify the authenticity of the original submissions, the
submitters’ identity, as well as the authenticity of intermediate processing.
Virtualization and trusted computing In matters of Grid job execution
protection, virtualization has been identified (see Section 8.2.3) as a strong
mechanism for mutual isolation of Grid jobs as well as for the protection of
a Grid Job Agent against access from executed Grid jobs.
By usage of trusted computing environments, such as proposed by
the Intel Trusted Execution Technology [84], even stronger levels of isolation
could be provided, while also lowering the necessary trust in a resource
provider and integrity of execution environments [121]. Within such a
scenario, mechanisms like the presented File and Job Certificates could
equally apply, and afford verifiable authenticity and authorship of Grid files
and job submission, while the according verifications could be provided
within the trusted environment. Hence, all players, viz. users, brokers,
and executing agents, could equally rely on the verification, while only
depending on the trusted environment’s operation and its manufacturer.
10.2 Cloud Computing
In matters of relevance of the herein presented work for the area of cloud
computing, the Cloud service Amazon Web Services (AWS) [7] is an exam-
ple for comprehensive customer liabilities, including theoretically severe
consequences for users of the service.
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An excerpt from the Amazon AWS customer agreement [10] is as follows:
“You will defend, indemnify, and hold harmless us, our affiliates [..] from and
against any claims, damages, losses, liabilities, costs [..] arising out of or relating to
any third party claim concerning: [..] your or any End Users’ use of the Service
Offerings [..] or violation of applicable law by you or any End User [..] Your
Content or the combination of Your Content with other applications [..] a dispute
between you and any End User. If we or our affiliates are obligated to respond to a
third party subpoena or other compulsory legal order or process described above,
you will also reimburse us for reasonable attorneys’ fees, as well as our employees’
and contractors’ time and materials spent [..] at our then-current hourly rates.“
In a nutshell, this signifies a service provider deploying its services on the
infrastructure of a cloud provider will be held liable for any consequences
of the usage, including the usage of its own end users. Assuming a cloud-
based e-Science infrastructure, this would imply a VO to be held liable for
any consequences of the use of the cloud services.
Hence, the accurate identification of liability with respect to the usage
of cloud services is a primal concern in case of security or legal incidents.
Which includes the protection of sincere users from malicious misuse of
their digital identity and consequent false accusation.
Mechanisms like a certification of the data imported and the tasks del-
egated by cloud users, analogous to the work presented within this thesis
in the context of e-Science Grid infrastructures, are assumed to be able to
thereby enhance, simplify and accelerate the identification of liabilities.
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